VOTING BEHAVIOR AND ELECTIONS*

Simon Schwartzman
University of California, Berkeley
Department of Political Science
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Note

       This paper can be seen as having three parts. The first, sections I to III, deals with the social strings that tie the voter to his political group of reference, The second includes sections IV to VI, and discusses the conditions and the consequences of a break in these ties - when the "voter gets loose." The third part is a brief reference to aggregate analysis, in section VII.

       The object of the paper is to present a general overview of the questions under study in the area, and of the major names and findings that appear in the literature. The decision to stress more or less on the different aspects of the field was highly arbitrary, although two limits existed. One limit was imposed by the structure of the Seminar on Political Behavior that includes specific papers in areas such as Authoritarian Personality, public opinion and mass communications, Southern Politics, and so on. References to these areas appear here only when necessary for the logical development of the paper, and always very briefly. The other limit was the decision to concentrate on the analysis of the behavior of the voter, and not on the effects of voting to the political system. There is no attempt to develop a fully integrated theory of voting, and it is likely that logical inconsistencies can be found in the text.

       Bibliographical references in the text include the author's name and the year of publication. The bibliography at the end of the paper is intended to be comprehensive for materials published in the last four years, and less so for previous periods. A bias existed in favor of comparative materials, which enjoyed a more liberal concept of adequacy to the subject.

       Only part of the sources in the bibliography is discussed or mentioned in the text. The data included in the text are not intended as demonstrations, but rather as examples of the points being made in each instance, and no effort was made to include systematically the evidence that might exist in the opposite direction for each case. Also, no effort was made to control for possible fallacies or spuriousness when comparative material was presented.

       The amount of material in the field, a paper already oversized and the difficulty of a systematic handling of heterogeneous sources and evidence can be seen as the excuses for these and other shortcomings.

Berkeley, February 1968.

VOTING BEHAVIOR AND ELECTIONS

I. Voting as a Form of Political Participation

a. Political and Non-Political Participation

Man is a social being, and as such he always participates in social life. But this participation is not constant: the intensity and types of participation are relevant variables in political analysis. Studies made on subjective alienation or anomie (Srole, 1956; Seeman, 1959 and 1966; Templeton, 1956 Erbe, 1964, etc.) indicate how the subjective feeling of integration in the society can vary, and studies on the development of communications in national systems point to some structural or global determinants of objective participation: Karl Deutsch (1966), as well as Lerner (1958), links the development of mass communications with the development of national communities, while Kornhauser (1959), looking at a modern context, sees in it rather the intensification and spreading of alienation. It is not difficult to trace these studies back to Durkheim's classical distinctions between forms of social solidarity and, more specifically, to his work on suicide and anomie.

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  Table 1.   Status and Alienation
                          % with high
    Status indicators:    alienation      (N)

    Race:
      Negro                   76           (25)
      White                   39          (140)

    Occupation:
      Manual                  60           (40)
      Non-manual              31          (106)

    Education:
       0-12 years             57           (51)
      13-15 years             32           (31)
      16 or more years        25           (64)

    Class Identification:
      Working or lower        58           (38)
      Upper or middle         32          100)

    Interviewer's SES estimate:
      Lower 2 quartiles       53           (68)
      Upper 2 quartiles       27           (78)
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Source: Templeton, Frederic, "Alienation and Political Participation - Some Research Findings," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 30, 1960, pp. 249-261. Taken from table 2, p. 254.

There are abundant data on the correlates of subjective participation. Without going very far, the study by Templeton (1960), based on a sample from Berkeley, shows how alienation (measured by

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Table 2.   Some Demographic Correlates of Social Group Participation

                                  % participation in:
                             one or more              not
         Demographic variable:   groups      none    ascertained

         Sex:
              Male                68          32         -
              Female             58          39         1

         Race:
              White               63          37         -
              Negro               69          31         -

         Age:
              Less than 30        56          43         1
              30-44               73          26         1
              45-59               66          34         -
              more than 60        51          49         -

         Education:
              Grade School        53          47         -
              High School         69          31         -
              College             80          19         1

         Income:
              less than 2,000     39          60         1
              2 ,000 - 4,999      66          34         -
              more than 5,000     79          20         1

         Occupation of head of family:
              Professional and
                 Managerial       77          23         -
              Other white collar  67          31         2
              Skilled & semi-skilled  65      35         -
              Unskilled           57          43         -
              Farmers             58          40         2

         Region:
              Northeast           70          30         -
              Midwest             63          31         1
              South               54          46         -
              Far West            59          39         2

         Type of Community:
              Metropolitan Areas  66          34         -
              Cities & Towns      65          35         -
              Open Country        56          43         1
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Source: Robert Lane, *Political Life*, Glencoe, the Free Press, 1959. Taken from table 5.3, p. 78

Srole's scale) is related to those variables that indicate a more central position in the social structure, in terms of different rank dimensions (table 1).

Data become more scarce when it comes to objective measures of participation or for cross-national comparisons. The data Robert Lane (1959) presents on social group participation have the same correlates as anomie (table 2), and Lerner has some evidence that the feeling of personal impotence (here in terms of participation in politics) tends to diminish when a country modernizes, as well as when a person modernizes himself within a country (table 3).

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       Table 3. Personal Impotency

                                 Traditional   Transitional   Modern

              Turkey                35%            33%          33%
              Lebanon               51%            35%          40%
              Egypt                 63%            73%          51%
              Syria                 90%            92%          37%
              Jordan                52%            57%          45%
              Iran                  63%           100%          72%


Source: Lerner, D., The Passing of Traditional Society, Free Press, New York,
1964, p. 100.  The countries are ordered according to an independent measure
of modernization.
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Lerner's data seem to go against the hypothesis of massification, although the systematic high feeling of impotency of the transitional groups suggests that these theories are not completely in the wrong. The study of Greer and Orleans (1962), back to the United States, shows the existence of a para-political structure that reduces the effects of massification. And Wilensky (1964), in his study of mass culture, seems to settle the question in a rather unexciting way: modernization, and what it implies in terms of massification, blocks man's descent to distant depths, but at the same time threatens high culture: "the net outcome is cultural uniformity at a slightly average level . . . "

There is thus a general phenomenon of more or less participation in society which can be measured both in its subjective and objective manifestations. Within nations, the level of participation seems to be determined, first, by the subject's position in the structure of social stratification and what it implies in terms of socialization, training, intellectual articulation, etc. Second, in transitional societies, participation seems to be a positive function of modernization, although transitional periods could lead to an accentuation of subjective alienation. Mass communications, undoubtedly, is a powerful variable, leading either to a paroxysm of intercommunication, as stated in some theories of nation-building, or to an atomization of society, according to other theoretical orientations. The evidence is that none of these extremes is true. Actually, the question is too complex to receive a satisfactory answer at this level of generality.

Moving away from the general question of an overall level of social participation, it is possible to inquire whether a person participates more or less in different areas, or spheres of participation - in

the economy, in the family, in religious activities, in peer groups, and in politics. The number of spheres that are perceived as differentiated and subject to varying amounts of participation is an empirical matter that falls within the general problem of institutional specification. In a hypothetical primitive and diffuse society, where the head of the family is also the priest, the head of government and the economic boss, the inquiry about "political participation" is meaningless. Bendix (1964), following the tradition of Tocqueville as well as Marx, shows how the ideals of equality introduced by the bourgeois revolution in England and France bring the differentiation of a political community in which each individual, as a citizen, "stands in a direct relation to the sovereign authority in contrast with the medieval polity in which that direct relation is enjoyed only by the great men of the realm." (p. 74) Two processes seemed to have occurred more or less simultaneously. One is the specification of a political sphere, with the elimination of patrimonialistic bindings of public offices. Political institutions are organized and dealt with independently from (although related to) other institutions of domination and authority such as the Church, the family, and the economy. The other is the legitimation, for all the population, of the right to be interested and to deal with this political institution that is now a *Res Publica*. Differentiation allows us to inquire about political participation as an autonomous phenomenon, while the generalization of the right to participate raises the question of how much, and in what form, is this right really performed.

Table 4. Political Participation, by Measures of Alienation

		Political Participation			
		High	Middle	Low	(N)
(A)	Powerlessness:				
	High (20 or more)	16%	51%	34%	(194)
	Medium (13-19)	22	51	27	(211)
	Low (12 or less)	39	45	16	(200)
(B)	Normlessness:				
	High (11 or more)	13	50	37	(197)
	Medium (6-10)	31	48	21	(192)
	Low (5 or less)	34	37	19	(209)
(C)	Social Isolation:				
	High (15 or more)	15	51	33	(189)
	Medium (9-14)	25	51	24	(225)
	Low (8 or less)	37	44	19	(177)
(D)	Alienation:				
	High (43 or more)	11	53	36	(188)
	Medium (30-42)	25	53	22	(189)
	Low (29 and less)	41	42	17	(196)

Source: Wilensky, H.L., 1964: "Mass Society and Mass Culture - Interdependence or Independence?" *American Sociological Review*, 29, pp. 173-197. Taken from table 3, p. 1

The conceptual independence of political participation from other forms of social participation does not mean, of course, lack of relationship. Wilensky, in the above-mentioned study, confirms with his data the close connection between general and political alienation. And Bendix, following the political history of England, shows how the extension to the lower classes of the right to participate politically was accompanied by an extension of the concept of citizenship which included also the universal rights of association and minimum education. The more or less simultaneous development of these dimensions of participation, in mutual interaction, is a special characteristic of a country like England which contrasts sharply with other societies where these rights developed at different paces. The example of the British colonies, where the extension of education was not followed by political enfranchisement, can be seen in contrast with many Latin American republics where the early political enfranchisement, with the introduction of compulsory vote and the creation of class association by the government did not parallel the expansion of education nor, in general, of economic and social development. The first situation is very likely to be at the roots of the national liberation movements of the educated elites in the British colonies, while the latter is at the basis of the "populist" style of politics which was so relevant in Latin America until the late fifties.

b. Levels of Political Participation

Although voting is the formal act by which a citizen performs his civic role, in a representative political system, the act of voting ranks very low in any empirical scale of political participation. The classic illustration of this is given in the Elmira study (Berelson and others, 1954), when they show that more people vote than pay attention to the political campaign and this at different levels of interest (table 5).

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Table 5. More People Vote Than Follow the Campaign

                                       Interest in the Elections

                           Great deal    Quite a lot      Not much
                           of interest   of interest      or no
interest
    Talked politics (June)       50%          29%            13%
    High on media exposure index 43%          20%            10%
    High on information index    51%          34%            19%
    Voted in November            82%          78%            58%



Source: Berelson, Lazarsfeld, McPhee, Voting, Phoenix Edition, 1966. Taken
from chart XI, p. 31.
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In the same line of thought, V. O. Key (1961) suggested a concept of "political stratification," and L. M. Milbrath (1965) presented a cumulative scale of political involvement of which voting is only the second step in a ladder of fourteen. Still, Stein Rokkan (1960), as a framework for comparative analysis, distinguishes five levels of political participation of which voting is the least intense. A comparison between Norway and the USA, using a three-point scale of participation, shows that the

figures for these two countries are similar, and follow the general pattern of limited participation (table 6).

Table 6. Political Participation in Norway and the USA, by Sex

	Norway			USA		
	Total Sample	Men	Women	Total Sample	Men	Women
Non-voters:	21%	15%	26%	27%	20%	33%
Only-voters:	57	55	60	59	64	55
Organizationally active	22	30	14	14	16	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100
(N)	(1,406)	(688)	(712)	(1,772)	(791)	(981)

Source: Stein Rokkan and A. Campbell, "Norway and the United States of America," *International Social Sciences Journal* 12, 1960, pp. 69-99. Taken from table 3, p. 78.

Table 7. Group Membership and Political Activity

Per cent who:	Group members	Non members
Say they voted in last Presidential election	72%	63%
Discussed labor problems in last week	63	36
Discussed the atomic bomb in last week	43	24
Discussed relations with Russia in last week	53	31
Expressed opinions on atomic energy policy	78	59
Expressed opinions on China policy	91	85

Source: Herbert Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "The Authoritarian Personality- a Methodological Critique," in Christie end Jahoda, eds., *Studies in the Scope and Methods of "The Authoritarian Personality* ," Free Press, 1954. Reproduced by Robert E. Lane, *Political Life*, 1959, p. 188.

The correlates of political participation, or involvement, are in general the same as those of social participation. All are part of the same syndrome of low level of articulation, lack of socialization

to more complex forms of social interaction, defective socialization to the dominant cultural patterns, and so on, that are usually related to the lower positions in the stratification structure. Regarding one of the dimensions of stratification, education, Campbell and his colleagues (1964) state that "there is ample evidence that these two characteristics - involvement and education--are functionally related." (P. 216.) We have seen in table 3 how stratification is related to group membership, and Robert Lane (1959) brings data (from Hyman's critique to *The Authoritarian Personality*) that show how group membership is, in turn, related to political activity (see table 7).

Although the major bulk of data is from the United States, evidence from other countries shows roughly the same tendencies. A sample survey carried out in Santiago, Chile, at the time of the Presidential elections of 1958 gives the following data on "active participation" (more than voting) (table 8).
What is most interesting, in the Chilean data, is that the level of participation at the lowest

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Table 8. Rates of Active Political Participation According to Sex, Age,
end Socio-Economic Group: Santiago, Chile, 1958.


                                      % active political
                                      participation  _      (N)

        Sex:
            Men                           42%               (306)
            Women                         20                (501)
        Age:
            21-34                         27                (230)
            35-44                         32                (223)
            45-54                         32                (133)
            more than 55                  22                (135)


        Socio-economic group:

            Large entrepreneurs           35                ( 17)
            Executives and University
                  teachers                46                ( 73)
            Small entrepreneurs           31                ( 61)
            White collars and teachers    27                (230)
            Craftsmen and independent
                  workers                 23                (177)
            Industrial and non-industrial
                  workers                 26                (246)
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Source: Guillermo Briones, "La Estructura Social y la Participación Política: un estudio de Sociologia Electoral en Santiago de Chile," *Revista Interamericana de Ciencias Sociales*, segunda época, vol. 2, número 3, Unión Panamericana, Washington. From table 11, p.

socioeconomic level is as high as at the level of white-collars and teachers. We can suspect that the level of participation of the workers would have been much higher if they were not lumped together with the workers of the tertiary, nonindustrial sector ("servicios"). Although our source does not show discriminated data on participation, the differences on political identification are striking.

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Table 9. Political Identification and Economic Sector, for Chilean Lower
Class

                                   Political Identification
                                              Others ,
                               Right   Left   DK, NA    Total  (N)

   "Obreros" (industrial
       workers)               26.2%  40.7%  33.1%      100%  (212)

   "Servicio" (non-industrial
       workers)               44.1   20.6   35.3       100    ( 34)

Source: Guillermo Briones,"La Estructura Social y la Participacion Política:
un  estudio  de  sociologia  electoral  en  Santiago  de  Chile," Revista
Interamericana de Ciencias Sociales, segunda época, Vol. 2, Número 3, Unión
Panemericana, Washington, D.C. From table 7, p. 392.
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What this finding indicates is the well-known fact that, besides the general level of participation and political involvement which is a function of the overall social position of the subjects in the stratification structure, there are social cleavages of various types which allow, within certain limits, other kinds of social and political participation that are much higher than it would be if the general correlations we find were simply lineal. We could see in table 2, for instance, that Negroes have a higher level of group participation than whites, although other data show lower levels of more specifically political kinds of participation. In the case of Chile, where political polarization is highly correlated with class structure, the major area for working-class participation seems to be in politics, a fact that comes out both in terms of leftist identification and high participation. This is, actually the general situation of countries where class-based polarization exists. Data from the Norway - USA study show how Norway approaches the Chilean pattern, whereas the United States is clearly different.

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Table 10. Participation in Organizations and Occupations, for Men, in
Norway and the United States.

              Norway                        United States
                        % actives                        % actives

   Manual workers          34      Manual workers           13
   Salaried employee       25      "White collar"           23
   Smallholder, fishermen  21
   Farmer                  43      Farmer                   12
   Other self-employed     30
   Pensioner. retired      21      Other                    11

Source: The same as table 6. Taken from table 9, p. 38.
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The conclusion is, thus, that the proposition that political participation is a positive and monotonous function of SES should be restricted to the United States, and even in this country limited

to contexts where major social and cultural cleavages do not occur. There is another American finding that cannot be easily generalized: the correlation (and, for many authors, the identification) between intensity of political participation and commitment to the political system. This is exactly the criticism that Alessandro Pizzorno (1966) makes about Milbrath's (1965) scale of political participation. There are other forms of political participation, he says, that does not fall within a continuum of more or less political integration, but are, nevertheless, politically oriented ("a street manifestation in protest against the conditions of a slum, or an economic group that transfers its resources to other countries as a way of making pressure on the government on a given political issue"). He goes on to distinguish between situations where political participation is either a private or a public matter, and also between situations where the action is consistent or not with the acceptable forms of political action in a given political culture. The typology of forms of political participation that comes out from these distinctions is the following:

	Prevalence of public solidarity	Prevalence of private solidarity
Action consistent with the political system	a) Political professionalism	b) Political participation as citizens
Action not consistent with the political system	c) Social movements	d) Political subculture

Typology of Forms of Political Participation

(Adapted from A. Pizzorno, 1966, p. 278.)

Studies on political participation very often consider only the type "b" failing to take into account either the discontinuity between the private political participation and political professionalism, or the distinction between integrative and non-integrative types of political participation, or both. We shall use these distinctions in the following development of this paper. They point to the fact that, besides the general question of the amount of political participation, there are differences in the meaning that can be subjectively attributed to a given political act, such as voting; or in other words, that the level of "'citizenshipness" is not the only possible dimension to which voting belongs.

c. Turnout

We can end this general discussion on participation with an overview of the question of turnout. To vote or not to vote is, of course, a very rough measure of participation but the availability of the data makes this one of the most studied items on voting behavior.

The classic work on this is Tingsten's *Political Behavior* (1937) that relates election turnout figures with age, sex, occupation and the characteristics of the voting system for different countries and through time. The basic findings still hold today: women vote less than men, youngest groups and old

ones vote less than middle-age groups, married vote more than single people, and, regarding social classes, "political interest grows with rising social standard" (p. 230). Two general laws are also suggested. First, the "law of dispersion," which states that the above differences tend to decrease when participation increases. He recognizes that this law is, or could be, a statistical construct ("the chances of dispersion obviously are inversely proportional to the electoral participation'), but considers it worth stressing even so. The other law is the "law of the social center of gravity." It says that "electoral participation within a group rises with the relative strength of the group in the electoral district," and also adds that, according to some data, this raise in participation is accompanied by more consistent class vote. This finding, confirmed by countless other studies since then, is at the basis of the hypothesis of cross-pressures as a major deterrent to political participation, which we will discuss in the part IV of this paper.

Lipset (1959), based on the evidence provided by the survey and ecological researches in the field, gives a table of the correlates of voting turnout that is quite complete and exhaustive. According to it, lower turnout is related to low income, low education, unskilled workers, servants, service workers, peasants, Negroes, women, young people, newcomers in community, workers in the United States, single and isolated individuals, and normal situations. Social factors affecting rates of voting turnout are the relevance of government policies to the individual, access to information, group pressures to vote and the presence of cross-pressures of different kinds (pp. 184-185).

In general, the distinction can always be made between those that always vote, a "hard core" that never votes, and the mass of floating voters that lie in between. There is another kind of fluctuation, the fluctuation between political loyalties, which is related but not identical to the former one. Those floating voters are what make the outcomes of the elections a less predictable affair and are, accordingly, object of more attention than are the consistent voters or the consistent abstainers.

II. The Decision to Vote

a. Do People Vote Rationally?

Studies on the level of public information regarding elections have destroyed the assumptions that were at the ideological basis of the representative systems, that people would use the maximum of their rational powers to decide the best vote they could. Moreover, says Converse (1966), "it is the least informed members within the electorate who seem to hold the critical balance of power, in the sense that alteration in governing party depends disproportionately on shifts in their sentiment." (p. 136.) Why the representative system very often (although not always) works smoothly in spite of this, or even because of it (Jones, 1954, among others, defends this point) does not concern us here. It is interesting to consider for a while, however, whether this lack of interest is a truly irrational act.

There are two classical analyzes that refer to this point. The first is called "Arrow's Paradox," which is presented among other places in Alker's Mathematics and Politics (Alker, 1965), pp. 141-146. The paradox consists in the fact that transitive preferences, at the individual level, can lead to intransitivity at the collective level. So, there is no point for the individual citizen to behave "rationally,'" if the system itself implies logical impossibilities. The other analysis is Downs's (1957), who, considering the electoral system as a system of imperfect information, shows how the cost of getting the

necessary information for a rational vote is higher than what can be obtained by this act of voting. In short, the conclusion is that to behave "irrationally"' is the most rational act, in a strict economic sense of the word. The fact that the higher frequency of this "irrational" act - voting - is found among the more articulated sections of the population is a hint, however, that elections are something else, and something more than a mere process of decision among conflictive issues.

b. Self-interest or Public Regardiness?

One possible answer to the problem of rationality is the idea that people often vote not for their personal interests, but for the interests of the community. For instance, Banfield (1958), in his work with Sicilian peasants, states that "successful self-government depends, among other things, upon the possibility of concerting the behavior of large numbers of people in matters of public concern. The subjects of this study, an extremely marginal group of peasants, reveal a pattern of "amoral-familism" that consists in not caring about what happens outside one's own family-and this is considered incompatible with the ideal of self-government.

Unconcerned with Arrow's demonstration of the difficulties of "concerting behavior of large numbers of people" in matters of choice, a further test on this dimension is intended in the United States by an ecological analysis of voting on different issues in Cleveland and Chicago (Wilson and Banfield, 1964). One of the main findings can be seen in table 11.

The negative correlations of the first column are easily explained by the fact that these items were to be paid with property taxes. Other data show that middle-income home owners are much more against these expenses than the high-income home owners, and more on items that are to be supported by property taxes than on items that have other economic sources. Besides, there is a group that votes "yes" for anything--the low income, Negro wards, that have nothing to lose. The high-income home owners, responsible for the inversion of the correlation signs in the second column, are those that, according to the authors, show authentic public-regardiness. They not only vote against their own interests (since they pay more taxes and do not benefit much from public services), but they also discriminate among the issues, which is taken as a sign of public concern. This general situation is modified, in a non-systematic way, by the differences in the ethnic composition of the wards, and this fact is explained by differences in cultural values of the ethnic groups.

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Table 11. Relationships between Wards Voting "Yes" on Various Issues with
Other Variables— Cleveland (33 Wards)
                                       Correlation(r) Partial
                                       with dwelling correlation*
                                       units owner-  with family
          Issue:                          occupied   income of ward

          Administration Building (11/59)   -0.86        0.49
          County Hospital (11/59)           -0.77        0.64
          Tuberculosis Hospital (11/59)     -0.79        0.57
          Court House (11/59)               -0.85        0.49
          Juvenile Court (11/59)            -0.83        0.66
          Parks (11/59)                     -0.67        0.48
          Welfare Levy (5/60)               -0.72        0.70
          Roads and Bridges (11/60)         -0.77        0.61
          Zoo (11/60)                       -0.81        0.59
          Parks (11/60)                     -0.57        (?)

          * Controlling for proportion of dwelling units owner-occupied.

Source: Wilson, J. Q., and E. C. Banfield, "Public-Regardiness as a Value
Premise in Voting Behavior," American Political Science Review, 1964, 58,4,
Dec., pp. 976-887.  The table above is taken from tables I and III.
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It is clear that, if this research proves anything, it is that the representative system is not based on the existence of a "public regardiness " attitude, and that the expression "seif-government" does not carry much empirical meaning.

For one thing, votes on issues are hardly a good indication of how people decide between candidates and parties. A study on the vote on an anti-subversive act, the "Francis Amendment" (Ferguson and Hoffman, 1964), for instance, showed how partisans tended to vote according to their perception of the position of their party's candidate. Instead of choosing the candidate as a function of the issues, issues are decided according to candidates. . . . And candidates are chosen, we may add, as a function of party preferences. In general, data from the Michigan studies (Campbell et al., 1964) show that an issue orients political behavior only in very special occasions: it must be familiar, it must arouse a minimal intensity of feeling, and it must bring a perception of party differences. And the data are in the sense that only 40 to 60% of the informed segment of the population sees differences among issues.

The other reason why Wilson and Banfield's research does not prove its points is the sheer small quantity of people with high "public-regardiness." As a matter of fact, the findings of the second column of table 11 are nothing but another instance of the differences that McClosky (1964) finds, systematically, between a sample of "influentials'" and a cross-sectional sample of the general electorate. Compared on attitudes about "basic" values and about the "rules of the game" in politics, the influentials are those who have a consistent picture of these values, and they endorse them not only in abstract, but also when applied to concrete situations. They are also those that understand and endorse the rules of the political game, of which they are the main players.

In short, voting is neither an instance of private rationality nor a confrontation between "private" and "'public-regardiness." There is not a process of rational collective decision by which the general public, as a body of citizens, decides the best policies and chooses the methods for implementing them. Rather, there is an elite which is the only one that understands what politics is about, how it is played, which are its main assumptions, and so on. This elite has a political ideology (in the sense of a consistent set of values and perceptions) that is not necessarily the one of "public-regardiness," but can be a less direct and more refined concept of self-interest. Other segments of the population are able to see politics in terms of narrow group-interests, and the rest not even this, as can be seen in table 12.

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Table 12. Summary of the Distribution of the Total Sample and of 1956
Voters in Levels of Conceptualization
                                         Proportiong of    Proportion
                                         total sample      of voters
        A    Ideology:
             1.  Ideology                    2.5%             3.5%
             2.  Near-Ideology               9                12
        B.   Group Benefits:
             1.  Perception of Conflict      14               16
                 Single-Group Interest       17               18
             2.  Shallow Group Benefit
                 Responses                   11               11
        C. Nature of the Times               24               22
        D. No   Issue Content:
             1.  Party Orientation           4                3.5
             2.  Candidate Orientation       9                7
             3.  No Content                  5                3
             4.  Unclassified                4.5              4
                                             100%             100%


Source: Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter, An Abridgment, Wiley,
1964, p. 144 (table 9-1).
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The relevance of these data for normative politics is obvious, although the conclusion is not. It is possible either to end up with the idea that only the elite has the right to do politics, or to consider that the elite knows better the rules of the game because the rules were set by and for this elite--and come up with an anti-elite conclusion.

It is not our task to settle this question here. For our purposes, the fact that democratic politics is not played according to its ideological assumptions leads simply to another question: How does it function? This will be the concern of the rest of this paper.

c. Is There a Decision?

People tend to vote in a way that is consistent with their previous votes and in agreement with the votes of their reference group. Because of this, election outcomes are a highly predictable phenomenon, and the variations that can be found from one election to another tend to reflect the instability of a part of the electorate that is the exception rather than the rule, in normal situations. This stability of voting behavior is expressed, in the North American context, by a stability of partisan

identification that often passes from generation to generation. A comparison between USA and France (Converse and Dupeux, 1966), shows that 82% of the American sample, as against 28% of the French, is able to characterize their father's political orientation. Other studies show that this knowledge means, in general, agreement. In the Elmira study, 63% of the respondents with fathers "usually" Republicans are Republicans, against only 46% of Republicans among those with fathers "usually'" Democratic, in a strongly Republican context.

The comparison between the American and French samples suggests that the sources and forms of political attachments can vary (the authors explain the finding by differences in patterns of father-sons interaction, but it is possible to think that, except for the Communists and until De Gaulle, the political picture in France has been rather confusing in the last decades), but the phenomenon tends to be general. The average citizen tends to develop stable patterns of behavior that remain, as much as possible, unchanged and protected against disturbing external influences. This stability is a function, of course, both of the general stability of the political system and of the exposure of the citizen to information about political facts. Philip Converse (1966) shows that the relation between information and stability is not lineal, but follows a "U" shaped pattern. Based on his analysis and on what has been discussed so far, the following types of citizens can be distinguished:

a. The *nonvoter* that does not know and does not care about politics (often referred to as "politically alienated") .

b. The *stable voter with no information*. His vote is always the same, according to a criterion which transcends the actual issues or names at stake--in general, in the United States, it is a partisan vote.

c. The *unstable voter with little information*, who cares little about politics, votes occasionally and erratically.

d. *The stable voter with high level of information.* He has a moderate knowledge of politics, is strongly identified with a party or a political group or tendency and votes consistently.

e. The *highly informed unstable voter*, who does not accept the institutional cleavages and makes his own decision at each moment. He is also referred to, sometimes, as "politically alienated."

We shall see, in part VII, how the distribution of voters among some of these categories changes through time. Let us keep in mind, from the ' previous discussion, that for the types "a," "b," and "'d," the problem of deciding the vote does not exist. The '"c'" type has to decide, and this is an important decision for the political system, since it makes winners - but the voter does not care much. The decisions of the '"e" group are much more difficult and serious--but generally irrelevant in aggregate terms. We will discuss the type "c" in part V and the type "e" in part VI of this paper; here we will look more closely to the stable voter.

1. Party Attachments

Data from the Michigan studies show that less than 10% of the American population fails to identify with one of the two political parties, and between 30 and 35% identify "strongly" with one of them (Campbell et al., 1966, p. 13). Donald E. Stokes summarizes the meaning of this: "to the average person the affairs of government are remote and complex, and yet the average citizen is asked periodically to formulate opinions about those affairs. At the very least, he has to decide how he will vote, what choice he will make between candidates offering different programs and different versions of contemporary political events. In this dilemma, having the party symbol stamped on certain candidates, certain issue positions, certain interpretations of political reality is of great psychological convenience." (Stokes, 1966, p. 126.).

To ask why people chose their parties is not always a meaningful question: most are born this way, in the United States and elsewhere. More meaningful is the question about the social variables that are correlated to party affiliation. The comparison that Campbell and Valen (1966) make of party identification in Norway and USA show that there is a much sharper differentiation between party identifiers in Norway than in the United States. The differences can be explained by the higher ideological polarization of the Norwegian politics and also by the fact that the American political scene is much more complex, and the same political party can mean different things at different places. The findings of the Converse and Dupeux (1966) comparison between France and the USA are much more intriguing. They open the question about which variables, in cross-national terms, explain the existence of different levels of party identification (only 45% of the Frenchmen that did not refuse to answer the question identify themselves with a party, and an additional 10 to 15% associated themselves with a more or less recognizable broad *tendence* (Converse and Dupeux, 1966, p. 277.).

There is no simple answer to this problem. In countries with a strong social-democratic, socialist or communist tradition, the party identification of the working class is achieved as an extension of the identification with the trade union, or with the group of equals in terms of occupation, income, education, and place of residence. It is an identification based on class-belongingness, and the worker's party is often institutionally tied with the trade unions. The identification to this "mass" party is very different from the identification to the other, "cadre" parties that are often defined simply as an opposition to the left--in the first case we could expect a much higher sense of belongingness, while in the second the identification would be mainly in negative terms, as anti-socialist. This is the case of the Nordic countries, Italy, France before De Gaulle, Chile, Argentina (with Peron's supporters as the equivalent of the worker's party identifiers), and so on. In other countries party identification follows other types of cleavages - linguistic, religious, racial, etc., - which may or may not be correlated with each other and with differences in class.

The more general pattern seems to be that party identification is done through positive or negative identification with some particular subgroup, the corollary being that the differences between the parties, and the amount of identification with them, will tend to diminish when the differences between these groups also diminish: it is the "end of ideology" argument. If this pattern is the rule, the situation in the United States is rather peculiar. Although there are some differences among the supporters of the national parties -the Democratic Party is the party of the workers, the Catholics and the Jews, among others--these differences tend to be minimal on the whole. The national parties aggregate supposedly incompatible tendencies and groups throughout the country, which tend to cancel each other regarding the final picture of the parties. In this situation the voter is unable, in general, to

point out differences among the parties. Data from the Norwegian - American study show that less than 6% of the strong identifiers in Norway, in all parties, say that there are no differences between policies of the parties, while the figures for American strong identifiers are 31% (Democrats) and 33% (Republicans). In spite of this diffuse picture — or perhaps because of it--we have the pervasive fact that almost everybody is able to define his party affiliation as the only symbol for political guidance. The slight differences that are perceived to exist between the parties are, still, those of the political realignment after the New Deal. Of sixteen issues on governmental policy presented to Republicans and Democrats, only in four items do they show differences that go above twenty percentage points--full employment, medical care, control of business influence, and taxes. In comparison, Labor and Conservative identifiers in Norway differ from 26 (defense budget) to 74 (interference with economic life) percentage points on six issues that were presented to them (Campbell and Valen, 1966, table 13-3, p. 260; the previous figures on identification are from table 13-2, p. 259). If a prediction can be made from the American situation, it is that the framework provided by the political parties is too thin to resist major social changes, or major political crises, that can provide fresher references for identification. On the other hand, the dimensions of the American political arena are big enough to absorb and compensate for any minor political deviation that occurs in particular areas or within particular groups, even at the price of further blurring of the political picture.

2. Local and National Politics

Is the national politics an aggregation of a myriad of local political identifications, or are local participation, and the votes that follow from it, a simple instance of an identification at the national level? There is, of course, a continuum between these two extreme forms of political attachment, which is worth exploring a little here.

It is an established fact that the common, private citizen cannot understand much of the political issues at the national level, and tends to participate either through identification with local political groups, or with professional associations, or through ethnic or religious affiliations, or finally through symbols of identification either personalized or institutional, such as a political figure or a political party. Sometimes the identification occurs at the level of the small community, sometimes at the level of the states, and in others directly at the national level (it can be also international, although this level of identification has never been numerically very important). If the identification is mainly at the level of the community, the number of levels of aggregation that are necessary to go from the loyalties at this level to election of the national government depends, of course, on the size of the country. In this sense the comparison between countries like Norway and the United States, or Chile and Brazil, can be misleading--political participation at the national level can mean very different things in countries of less than ten million inhabitants or in countries of one hundred million. If the identification is at a higher level, the vote at the lower level tends to be considered less relevant and is a simple deduction from the other.

The question is, then, about the conditions that lead the private citizen to identify and to participate directly in national politics, or to limit his horizons to local politics and let the supra-local politics to the responsibility of his representative. One of these conditions is of an institutional character--systems of indirect representation suppose exactly that the citizen is not qualified to vote

directly, the presidential systems suppose he is, and the way things are set legally have consequences on actual behavior.

Besides this institutional aspect, two broad variables seem to be basic for characterizing the differences. The first is the relevance that local, as against national, politics has for the citizen. The historical tendency seems to be in the direction of a progressive increase of the weight of the national over local government, and of the preponderance of the national over local politics. A parallel development is the increase of the relative weight of the executive branch of the government over the legislative, which is also expressed by the relatively higher relevance the executive elections have for the voter. Burnham (1965) gives some evidence that the secular decrease on turnout in the United States is also accompanied by an increase of "roll-off the disregard for the lower level candidates in the ballot. Other data point to the "surge" phenomena--an increase of turnout levels for the presidential elections and a drop in the off-years elections (Campbell, 1966a).

Although this is the general tendency, the assumption of a lineal evolution in the direction of a progressive decadence and subordination of local politics can be misleading. In underdeveloped contexts, where modernization is introduced from above, national politics can acquire a sudden relevance by the breakdown of traditional patterns and institutions that only gradually, with new institutionalization at lower levels of government, can be reduced. In a developed context it is possible to expect that the rise of the standards of life and the improvement of housing conditions will tend to increase the concern of the private citizen with his local community (the Wilson and Banfield study can be seen as an evidence of this), regardless of the relative size and relevance of the central government. Perhaps the best hypothesis is a "U"-shape type of development.

The other broad variable is the continuity or discontinuity between the local and the state or national levels of politics. This continuity can be phrased in terms of differences on political culture, but could also be operationalized in more precise ways: it is a question of knowing whether the alternatives presented on local elections are an expression, or somehow an equivalent, of national alternatives, or are idiosyncrasies that have no real correspondence at a higher level. The Ala'ilima's study on Eastern Samoa (1966) is a good example of the persistence of a system of decisions via consensus, based on the authority of tradition and prestige, in the confrontation with a pluralist, one-man-one-vote system that is imposed from above. This coexistence of two systems (which the authors consider to be threatening to both) does not seem to occur in Pakistan (Rashiduzzaman, 1966). Here the traditional patterns of prestige are being shaken, low status parvenus are able to win the office--and this is combined with an intensive use, for propaganda purposes, of the only yardstick available for judging candidates, the traditional values of piety, altruism, Justice, impartiality, and so on. This breakdown of the traditional norms does not mean, however, that elections became national, since national issues are relevant only inasmuch as they can be translated into local conflicts. But at the same time the author points to the existence of "political workers," mainly students coming from urban areas, who made speeches and campaigned in terms of national issues.

The case of Barbacena, Brazil (Murilo de Carvalho, 1966), illustrates another possibility: the transference of traditional patterns of politics to a modern context. What the study does is to describe how two rival local families, thanks to the positions they held in the state and national politics, were able to keep the allegiances of their followers in a situation of quick urbanization. What they did was to

compensate the elimination of the traditional rural ties of dependence by the creation of an enormous amount of public Jobs that were distributed through their followers.

The local voter, in the Samoan as well as in the Brazilian cases, has a clearly predictable vote. In the case of Pakistan, as in the cases of identifications at the national level, the predictability is lower. But there are other forms of attachments, of a sub-cultural type.

3. Sub-cultural (Religious, Ethnic, Regional) Vote

When political cleavages follow sub-cultural lines, there is an identification between political party and subculture. In Guiana the political parties represent the White, Negro and Indian population, for instance, while in The Netherlands religious cleavages are prevalent. Even in situations where there are no such cleavages, minority groups tend to identify in a systematic way with a given political party--this is the case, for instance, of the Catholics in the United States, as well as the Jews and the Negroes all tend to vote Democrat, which is, historically, the party of the "left" (Alford, 1963 and 1963b).

In the case of the United States, how much is the vote of the Catholic, for instance, a Catholic vote? This is the question that Converse (1966c) analyzes regarding the Kennedy election. One of his tables shows how religion leads to deviance from what one could expect to be the "normal vote" of a Catholic sample.

The influence of the religious factor seems to be present, although not too strongly. When the political cleavage does not follow religious lines, when the religious issue is not salient in the political campaign, the probability is that the religious factor will have just a marginal influence on those that are indecisive in the first place. It is difficult to disentangle, for the Catholic Democrats, how much of their affiliation is due to either of the two identifications. But, for the atypical case, the conclusion is clear: "despite our interest in the exceptions, the fact remains that Protestant Democrats were more likely to behave as Democrats than as Protestants, and Catholic Republicans were more likely to behave as Republicans than as Catholics." (Converse, 1966c, p. 123.).

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Table 13. Political Preferences of the Catholic Community, The 1960
Presidential Democratic Vote Deviation


 Identification with the
 Catholic Community:
                                      Church Attendance

                                 Seldom,
                        Regular   Often   Never   Total   (N)
           High           22%      14%     --      23%    (101)
           Medium-high    21%      12%     --      20%    (109)
           Medium-low     14%      11%     6%      12%    (102)
           Low             9%      --      4%       3%    (65)
              Total       16%      7%     10%

               (N)        (271)   (47)    (59)



Source: Philip E. Converse, "Religion and Politics: The 1960 Election," in
Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, Elections and the Political Order,
Wiley, 1966, p. 108.

(The cell entry in each case is the increment in the Democratic proportion
of the two party presidential vote on the basis of what could be expected
from 1958 outcomes.  Only cells with more than ten cases have been
entered. We omitted here the "N" of the partial cells.)
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The same type of reasoning could be applied for other sub-cultural groups. The regional vote, very often, combines the problems of political subculture and those of local politics which we discussed before. There is no room, here, to enter in this problem with the depth it deserves.

III. Vote and Class

Class identifications, class consciousness, class struggle, and other related terms are often presented as the main concepts for the explanation of political behavior, including voting. This emphasis, which is mainly European, contrasts sharply with the little relevance of these concepts in American literature. There are some obvious ideological reasons for that, but also some good empirical facts: the little relevance of class in the political behavior of the American voter. This variable was never very important; it came to its maximum perhaps in the thirties, and it is dropping steadily since then (Converse, 1958). Actually, when the term "class"' is found in American literature, it very often conveys the meaning of "strata" or occupational status, without the connotations of political subculture arid social cleavages that are traditionally associated with the term. In our discussion of problems of political participation, in part I, we were able to show with data from Chile (tables eight and 9), how discontinuities appear in the ladder of social stratification, with an increase of social and political participation which in general does not follow the dominant rules of the political game, or follows them only partially. This is, more typically, the usual meaning of "class politics" which we shall report here.

Erik Allardt ("Patterns of Class Conflict and Working Class Consciousness in Finnish Politics," 1964c) presents an excellent study of Finnish Communism which is worth reporting in some detail. The situation in Finland is peculiar in the sense that it presents an extreme political polarization in terms of social class. Sixty-eight per cent of the workers are communists or socialists, 54% of the farmers are Agrarian, and 61% of the middle and upper classes identify with one of the three bourgeois parties. A comparison of Alford's index of class voting (1963) for the Scandinavian countries, reported by Allardt, shows that "while almost the same percentage of the working class in these two countries (Norway and Sweden) votes for Left parties as in Finland, a higher proportion of the middle and upper classes in these two other countries vote for Left parties than in Finland. (p. 102.) The division is more clear-cut, and the simple existence of a strong Communist Party in Finland is an indication of strong polarization. Data on social mobility for four Scandinavian countries point to the extremely low social mobility of Finland, contributing to the division of the country along the class lines. When Communists are compared with Social Democrats, the latter appear as less radical, more prone to collaborate with the bourgeois party, and in general more revolutionary. As for background elements, the Communists are of lower income, and are more prone to have experienced unemployment. The more relevant data, however, appear when a difference is introduced between the more developed, South and West, and the less developed, Worth and East parts of the country. Communists are stronger in rural than in urban areas and more characteristically rural in the North end East than in the South and West areas (table 14).

```
Table 14. Communist Party Preference by Urban and Rural Areas in the South
& West and North & East in a Finnish National Sample 1958

                        Percent that Prefer the Communist Party:

                                  Urban              Rural

                  South & West    29%                34%

                  North & East    26%                45%

Source: Allardt, Erik, "Patterns of Class Conflict and Working-Class
Consciousness in Finnish Politics," Transactions of Westermark Society,
10, taken from table 10, p. 114.
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The differences between urban, "industrial" communism and the communism of the rural areas ("backwoods" communism) are clearly revealed when the Communist vote is related with a series of background variables, for the two regions (table 15).

Industrial Communism appears as a traditional political orientation, tied up with the past and relatively independent from economic hazards. Backwoods Communism, on the contrary, is dependent upon unemployment and is more active and participant. If this is so, it is possible to expect that the increase in Communist strength will be related to the same factors of insecurity that explain the Backwoods Communism. A factor analysis of different voting and background variables show that, for each of the five regions of the country under separate analysis, Communist strength and increase in Communist strength have high loadings in different factors and in the expected direction. Communist increase is explained, in almost all areas, by factors reflecting insecurity, social change, and migration.

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Table 15. Ecological Correlations, Computed Separately for the South &
West and North & East of Finland, Between Communist Votes in 1954, and
Variables Measuring Social and Economic Conditions


                                         South & West      North & East
                                         (industrial       (backwoods
                                          communism)        communism)


   Political Traditions:

      The proportion of insecure tenant
       farmers (crofters) in 1910             .31               .01
      The rate of Reds killed in
       the Civil War of 1918                  .42               .06
      The Social Democratic Vote in 1916     .59              -.01

   Economic Variables:

      Income per capita in 1950              .17               .14
      Variance in Income per capita
        in 1950                             -.01               .15
      Rise in Income per capita from
        1950-1956                            .09               .04

   Economic Insecurity:

      Unemployed in 1931-32                  .16               .36
      Unemployed in 1948-53                 -.24               .41

   Other Characteristics :

    Industrial workers in 1950               .47               .14
    Migration out of the commune in 1953     .24              -.14
    Turnout in 1958                          .05               .43
    Church attendance, 1953-6                .35              -.27
    Sunday School attendance, 1953-6         .31              -.33

Source: The same as table 14. Taken from table 11, p. 117.
```

Generalizing from these findings, Allardt (1964b) suggests that Communist support in developed areas in strong where "a) political traditions are very strong, b) economic change is rather slight and social conditions are stable, c) geographic migration is slight, and d) the class structure is comparatively rigid and inequality is presumably strongly perceived." In less developed areas, however, Communism is strong where "a) traditional values such as religion have declined in importance, b) economic change is rapid, c) social insecurity prevails, and d) geographical migration is common." (pp. 83-84.).

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Table 16. Time of Voting Decision in the Elections of 1958, for Communists
, by Area in a Finnish National Sample, 1958.

                                    South & West        North & East

                                    (industrial         (backwoods
                                     communism)          communism)

        Time of Decision:

            Decided long ago            81%                 56%

            Decided two months
            before the elections         1                  --

            Decided some weeks
            before the elections         6                   2

            Decided just before
            the elections               15                   5

            Don"t know                   1                  --

            Did not vote                 10                  23

                                        100%                100%
            (N)                         (107)               (71)

Source: The same as table 14. Taken from table 14, p. 129.
```

It is obvious that, although the same vote, the political action of an "industrial" communist means something quite different from that of the "backwoods" communist. They are different in motivation, in intensity and in the ideological presumptions that guide them. One falls into what Pizzorno calls "political subculture," while the other is much closer to what he calls "political movements" (see above). The industrial Communist does not have to decide his vote, while a decision exists for the newcomer (see table 16).

We shall turn now to a more general discussion of the non-traditional, unstable voter.

IV. 'The Voter Gets Loose"

So far we have been discussing the different kinds of social attachments that free the voter from the often difficult task of deciding his vote. Now we turn to the conditions under which a decision does have to be made. The first question, here, is about the circumstances that contribute to loosen the voter's attachments to traditional loyalties, and, related to this one, the question about the relative strength of these loyalties. The other question refers to what the voter does when he is free (or when he is forced) to decide. There are two possibilities, essentially: one is to lose his points of reference, and to behave

in an unstable and erratic way. The other is to increase the political participation, by a reassessment, generally on ideological grounds, of his role as a political man. We shall consider the first question here, and leave the others to the following sections of the paper.

a. Changes in Voting Behavior

One way of dealing with this question is to inquire about the broad social changes that lead to aggregate changes in the patterns of political participation. In the literature of political development this is the known question of which factors lead to the mobilization of the population in political terms (Germani, 1963, Deutsch 1966b, Lerner 1958, among others).

The theory is that the process of modernization, mainly through the development and widespread use of mass communications, and actual physical mobility to urban centers, breaks the traditional ties of political allegiance and at the same time increases the subjects' awareness of the political sphere. We have already discussed this perspective at the beginning of the paper, regarding the overall determinants of political participation.

The analysis of voting change in aggregate terms is not, of course, limited to the context of the underdeveloped countries. A study by Pomper (1967), for instance, shows how the American elections since Kennedy have meant a radical departure from previous patterns of voting, when states are taken as units for comparison. Many different factors have contributed to this change, and one of them is the sheer geographical mobility of the population. Data from *The American Voter* show that, in 1956, 48% of the residents of the Far West were immigrants, from the North (three-quarters of them) or from the South. Northern immigrants, although not more Republican than their counterparts in the North, voted massively for Eisenhower. They brought a Republican influence to the traditionally pro-Democratic West which is not compensated by the smaller, less participant and less affluent group of Southern immigrants. (Campbell et al., 1964, p. 234-5).

Table 17. <u>Relation of Reported Changes in Own Occupational Status to Changes in Self-Identification with Parties, 1956</u>

	Occupational Mobility	
	<u>Down</u>	<u>Up</u>
<u>Changes in party identification</u>:		
From Republican to Democratic	28%	24%
From Republican to Independent	8	12
From Democratic to Independent	32	29
From Democratic to Republican	32	35
	100%	100%
Number of cases	(47)	(121)

Source: Campbell et al., *The American Voter - An Abridgment*, Wiley, 1964, table 14-2, p. 241.

More interesting, theoretically, than the quantitative changes in political attitudes of geographical units, is the question of the impact of social and geographical mobility upon the voters themselves. The general belief is that geographical mobility is accompanied, in general, by social mobility, and this entails a change in political orientations. Campbell and his associates, however, show that their data tend to disconfirm this. There are, for sure, differences in the political attitudes of movers and non-movers (people that move from city to suburbs tend to be Republican, other factors controlled), but not only is it not clear that change in space means social change) but data also indicate that social movers do not change orientations more often than non-movers. Finally, when there are changes, they are not related systematically to the direction of the movement.

Some studies in England seem to point to the same direction. They deal with the effect of affluence in the class polarization of politics. Does affluence lead to an "embourgeoisment' of the working class, and a corresponding shift in party orientations? Goldhorpe and Lockwood (1963) argue that this is not necessarily so, since there are other considerations such as security and the prospects of future advancement, that keep the worker identified with his class even when economic mobility occurs. A research work done by Runciman (1964) confirms this persistence of class identification in the situation of affluence.

The explanation for these findings should not be difficult. A change in political orientation is a rather complex process that one should not expect to follow directly from a change in occupational position. It is not only a question of a change of interests, but a reorientation of cognitive and value elements that demands both an investment of interest and energy and the support of a new reference group. The most likely would be that social mobility leads to lower levels of political interest and participation, and this is exactly the type of finding that Barrie Stracy (1966) reports of his research. Among other things, his in-depth interviews show that the mobile person is considerably more likely than the static person to have little interest in political matters, to be apathetic politically and to abstain from voting.

Social mobility, then, is one of the determinants of a syndrome of political detachment which includes changes of vote between elections, low interest in the elections, low concern with the outcome, low attention to communications, difficulty to make up one's mind about the vote and exposure to persuasion. (Berelson et al., 1954, p. 347, item 202 of the list of findings.) Some people are brought to this syndrome by social and/or geographical mobility, others by other processes which include, for instance, a higher exposure to mass media, as indicated by the Converse studies (see Converse, 1966, and p. 21 above). But many persons never became apathetic, indecisive or unstable voters--they always were so, by reasons that might include a low social position or participation in a set of contradictory or inconsistent norm expectations. This last possibility is, actually, one of the most usual explanations for voting instability or political withdrawal, which deserves a closer look.

b. Cross-Pressures

Since Catholics tend to be Democrats, it is natural to inquire about the special characteristics of Republican Catholics or Democrat Protestants. These persons are said to be under "cross-pressures": they belong simultaneously to groups that tend to be viewed as opposites, and one can expect that they will behave in a special way.

One of the characteristics of these persons is their role as bridges among the groups to which they belong: data of the Elmira study show that, in fact, persons under cross-pressures tend to have more contact and discuss more with people of opposite views than others.

```
Table 18. Percentage (two party) of October Discussions Opposite August
Intentions

                                        Non-union              Union
                                        white-collar           labor

                Protestants             12% (116)          26% (94)
                Catholics               36%  (39)          25% (48)

Source: Berelson, Lazarsfeld, McPhee, Voting, p. 129. From Chart LXIII,
p. 129.
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One could suppose that these criss-crossed social roles could be functional for the lessening of social polarization and the avoidance of major social conflicts (Galtung, 1966). In any case, the fact is that this social position leads to indecision and to an actual shift in partisan preferences.

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Table 19. Percentage of Voters Who Made Late Decisions (Final Vote Not
Decided Until October or Later)
                                        With cross-      No cross-
                                        pressure          pressure

                Religion and class          23%              19%
                Friends and co-workers      23%              14%
                Friends and family          35%               7%


Source: The same as table 18, from Chart LXV, p. 131.
```

```
Table 20. Percentage (Two Party) Defectors to Opposite Party in August,
Among:

                                   June Republicans       June Democrats

        Protestants:

            Non-union white collar    1% (141)            29% ( 7)
            Union labor               8% ( 90)            21% (43)

        Catholics :

            Non-union white collar   19% ( 32)            12% (25)
            Union labor              22% ( 27)             5% (37)

Source: The same as table 18, from Chart LXIV, p. 130.
```

The American Voter examines less the determinants of the conflict than what it means and what it implies when it is perceived as such by the subjects. The subject under cross-pressures has inconsistent attitudes (inconsistent in terms of the prevailing political polarization) and the correlates of this inconsistency are summarized by the authors as follows: "The person who experiences some degree of conflict tends to cast his vote for President with substantially less enthusiasm, he is much more prone to split his ticket in voting for other offices, and he is somewhat less likely to vote at all than is the person whose partisan feelings are entirely consistent." (p. 46.)

The cross-pressure hypothesis can be used to explain the high levels of turnout which are found in social and politically homogeneous areas: the cross-pressures are non existent, and in consequence there are no obstacles to political participation (Allardt and Bruum, 1956). The same effect is found in France (Dupeux 1964), and here again the same explanation is offered. A closer look to the French data shows that the smaller (and supposedly the more homogeneous) the places are, the higher is the turnout and the more relevant are local contests as compared with national disputes (table 20a).

But it is obvious that high turnout cannot be explained simply in terms of a lack of obstacles to voting. it demands a positive stimulus. A possible answer for that is what is known as the "majority effect,' which, as Cutright (1963) shows, brings an extra amount of support to parties that are overwhelmingly dominant. Besides this factor, another element is necessary: the existence of an identification of the majority with a political minority, or a political subculture. This is the case of the rural vote in France and also in Finland, where the highest levels of turnout are found in the Swedish districts. Data from rural areas in the United States, on the other hand, show high turnout and partisan variability, combined with a high sensitivity to price fluctuations, patterns that are interpreted by the authors of The American Voter as to indicate a low level of political attachment and lack of traditional political loyalty (Campbell et al., 1964, Chapter 13, p. 210 ff.).

```
Table 20a.  France, Deferential Turnout in Communes or Different Size


                                                % of turnout

Average Population, 1959:     National 1958)  Local(1959) % diff.

    Below 400                 76.9             83.0          -6.1
    401-700                   77.7             82.5          -5.3
    701-2,000                 80.4             82.0          -1.6
    above 2,000               80.4             76.5           3.9



Source: Kesselman, M.,"French Local Politics:: A Statistical Examination,"
American Political Science Review 60,4, December 1966, pp. 963-973.
```

There is another way in which the simultaneous participation in different social groups is considered, in the literature, as a determinant of political attitudes and behavior. It consists in considering not the effect of conflicting norms, but the conflicting problems of identification that it brings to the subject, in terms of his position in the social structure of stratification. We are referring,

of course, to the question of the effects of status inconsistency (or rank inconsistency, or status crystallization) upon political attitudes and voting.

c. Status-Consistency

The rationale of the status-consistency hypothesis is fairly simple: it is uncomfortable to a person to be at the same time high in one rank dimension and low in the other. If this is so, the consequences will be that he will try to correct this inconsistency, or, if this is impossible, to express his feelings about it. This basic idea can be complicated in many ways, adding, for instance, the specification of the types of status (ascribed or achieved, for instance) that are either high or low.

The already classic article by Lenski (1954) shows that, actually, people with low consistency (or low "crystallization," a term that seems to have been abandoned) vote, indeed, more Democrat, what can be taken as an indication of radicalism (see table 21 above).

Consistency was measured, here, as the dispersion of the values a subject has on different (in this case, four) rank-dimensions that have been previously standardized. Lenski does not distinguish between the different status profiles that are lumped together in his measures of inconsistency. Thus, when he looks for inconsistency effects on Alford's data (Lenski, 1967) he simply compares the number of high-status Catholics plus low-status Protestants with the consistent subjects regarding the percentages of leftist attitudes.

```
Table 21. Voting Behavior and Preferences in the 1948, 1950, and 1952
Elections:, by Degree of Status Crystallization, After Correction.


          % Democrats:


     Year:           Status Crystallization    Probability less than:
                     Low         High
     1948            82.2*       71.4*                   .05
     1950            83.0        71.3                    .04
     1952            72.2**      68.0**                  .46


     *     Includes the Progressive Party.
     **    "Preference" for Democrat.

Source: G Lenski,"Status-Crystallization: a non-vertical dimension of Social
Status," American Sociological Review 19, 1954, pp. 405-13.  Taken from table
4, p. 410.
```

This distinction is made, however, by Jackson (1962) when he finds that inconsistency due to racial-ethnic rank superior to occupational rank is associated with symptoms of stress: the poor white punishes himself for his low rank, while the rich Negro, it would appear, is more able to transform his frustration into social protest. Going still further, Landecker tries to distinguish which types of

class-consciousness would be associated with different kinds of consistency or inconsistency (Landecker, 1963).

Criticism of the status-inconsistency hypothesis has been frequent, and evidence has been both in the direction that the effects of inconsistency do not exist or are irrelevant (Brandmeyer, 1965, Kelly and Chambliss, 1966, and others) or that the effect is to increase right-wing radicalism (Rush, 1967). A discussion is also going on at the methodological level, where it is shown that Lenski's technique of measuring inconsistency does not account for the independent effects of the variables that enter into the definition of the status configuration) nor for their interaction (Hyman 1966, Blalock 1966). Some attempts exist to bring these propositions to a clearer conceptualization (for instance Anderson and Zelditch, 1964, Galtung 1964), but so far it has been impossible to obtain a satisfactory fit between theory and data. For our purposes here it is enough to state that, although inconsistencies seem to have an important impact upon political attitudes and behavior, the difficulties of operationalization of the concepts have made difficult not only the verification of the propositions but also a better conceptualization of them. In spite of that, the heuristic interest of thinking in terms of inconsistencies cannot be denied.

If a summary could be made of the hypotheses of cross-pressures and status-inconsistency it would be that, although conceptually related, and possibly overlapping, they point to two different directions. While cross pressures are an explanation for some instances of political apathy or withdrawal, status-inconsistency aims to explain the intensification of political participation through radicalism. A conceptual exercise could be made by combining both and suggesting that cross-pressures lead to indifference or withdrawal when they are not followed by intense inconsistencies of rank, and that rank-inconsistency leads to radicalism when it is not combined with conflictive solidarities (a conceptual distinction between "rank," a stratification concept, and "status," meaning simply the subject's role-set, would also be useful). In any case, it is clear that cross-pressures do not explain all the variance of political indifference, nor does inconsistency explains much of the variance in radicalism. We can take them as possible examples of explanation and move on to a closer look to the unattached voter.

V. "The Voter Gets Loose": 1) Indifference

a. Exposure to Mass Persuasion Mechanisms

If voting is not a tradition, and if the voter does not care much about his role as a citizen, we would expect him to be exposed to the effects of mass-persuasion: the mechanism of voting decision would not be different, essentially, from the mechanisms of decision about which detergent or mouthwash should be bought. This is so, actually, but only among those who are open to the influences of mass persuasion and at the same time have passed through one of the processes that lead to political unattachment. There are two topics that are usual in the study of mass persuasion, the effects of the mass media and the inter-personal influence.

1. Political Propaganda Mass Media and Bandwagon Effect

The literature on the effects of political propaganda and the mass media on voting is big enough to deserve a paper in itself, and we can only make a very brief reference to it here. In general, these studies tend to disconfirm the image of the mass media as an all-powerful agent of change. A study by Glazer (1965) shows that TV is capable of giving a more defined image of the candidates for the voters, but has no effect upon turnout. An earlier study of Sola Pool (1959) confirmed that people tend to be more defined about the candidates after exposure to TV--but also that the images of the candidates are made similar by the media, and the distinctions tend to blur. The effect of media is small or null, also, regarding the effects of the image they can diffuse about who is going to or who is winning the election contest. The idea that people tend to modify their vote according to the early perception of the outcome — the "bandwagon effect"is not confirmed by evidence (Fuchs, 1965 and 1966, Mendelson, 1966). An experiment with students showed a tendency to balance the outcome of an election, when the only factor operating is the knowledge of numerical unbalance (Laponce 1966); but this effect does not appear when there is an actual reference to candidates (Dizney and Roskens, 1962), and it is doubtful whether a "tendency to equibalance" plays any role in politics (our previous discussion shows a "majority effect" that works in the opposite direction, by different reasons).

The conclusion is not only that mass media have little effect upon changes in political attitudes, but that they often have the opposite effect of reinforcement. Exposure to mass media is related to all the background variables that come with turnout and stability of voting patterns (organization membership, education, socioeconomic status, sex, and the like) and there is a tendency for the voter to select the media and to perceive the information that confirms his previous preferences. The mass media, and all the climate of the political campaign, are able to 'reactivate" the dormant political attitudes, so that undecided voters return to old loyalties and neutrals take a stand. If this is so, table 22 taken from the Elmira study does not come as a surprise.

```
Table 22. The More Media Exposure on the Campaign, the More the Strength
of Support for the Candidate.

      Percentage differences between those with higher and lower
      communications Exposure:

                                                     Support in August

                          Very strong*  Fairly strong   Neutral**


   Support in October:

           Very strong:        12***           14         10
           Fairly strong:      -3               3         17
           Neutral:            -9             -17        -27


     *  "Very strong:" intend to vote and feel strongly for choice.
    **  "Neutral:" undecided or do not intend to vote.
   ***   This figure is the percentage difference between those with
       higher and those with lower media exposure who remained with
       very strong support for the candidate from August to October.

Source: Berelson, et al.,Voting. Taken from Chart CXIII, p. 247.
```

What this table tells us is that those exposed to mass communications tend to be more stable in their attitudes than the ones with law exposure if they have a strong political identification; but they tend to be less stable if they are neutral or with weak identification. The direction of change of the undecided, although activated by the mass media, does not seem to depend on the content of the messages carried by them. Mechanisms of selective perception are usually at work here, and changes are chiefly determined, as shown in the Elmira study, by the preferences of the family, the friends, the co-workers, and so on. Changes are a function of the mechanisms of interpersonal influence and the mass media only operate, when they do, through the "two-steps flow" mechanisms, which carry changes only when the opinion leaders, somehow, are caught in a process that leads to indecision.

2. Precinct Work

If interpersonal influence is an essential element in the formation and change of public opinion, it is natural to expect that a sizable part of the political campaigns would be carried on by the door-to-door electioneering of the grass-roots politicians in their precincts. The political relevance of the personal link that the grass-roots politician establishes with the private citizen has been stressed many times. St'Angelo (1965), for instance, shows how these politicians perform the role of a broker between the general public and the political parties and government, in a system of reciprocal dependence between the former, who gets services, and the latter, who gets votes. We should not expect, however, that this kind of brokerage would be a dominant technique for getting political support: this type of bargaining becomes inaccessible for the private citizen when one moves from the small town to a large

city, and from local to state and national politics. At these high levels political brokerage is a specialized and expensive activity that is available only for organized interests and is not directly linked with the voting behavior of large populations.

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┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Table 23. Charter Voting and Avowed Campaign Activity of Democratic Ward   │
│ Chairmen on Charter (in percent)                                           │
│                                                                            │
│                                           Chairman's Avowed Campaign       │
│                                           Activity on Charter:             │
│                                                                            │
│                                      Active       No        Active         │
│                                      Support     Action    Opposition      │
│                                      (N = 5)     (N=6)      (N=2)           │
│                                                                            │
│         Vote in favor of the Charter    46.8      36.7       22.0          │
│         Democratic Vote:                71.3      69.2       58.2          │
│         Vote for Charter as a                                              │
│         percentage of Democratic vote   65.6      53.0       37.8          │
│                                                                            │
│ Source: Raymond E. Wolfinger, 'The Influence of Precinct Work on Voting    │
│ Behavior," Public Opinion Quarterly 1963, 27, 3, Fall, pp. 387-398. Table  │
│ 3 in the text, p. 395.                                                     │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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But there is another way in which precinct work is done: when it carries a personal appeal of a local influential, instead of a profitable bargain. This is the situation where the mechanisms of interpersonal influence are free to operate without the interference of material interests. A study made by Wolfinger (1963) in New Haven confirms that, in the vote for some obscure changes of the City Charter, where the Republican opposition was strong, and the Democratic support conflictive, precinct activity of Democratic leaders was decisive (see table 23, above).

In spite of the small sample, it is interesting to notice how the Chairmen's support for the Charter was related to the existence of a Democratic majority. Could it be possible that the increase of votes for the Charter was a consequence of a "majority effect," instead of a function of the precinct activity? This is tested in another context by Cutright (1963) (see table 24).

The effect of precinct work remains though much smaller, when the majority effect is controlled. We can suppose that precinct activity would be superfluous in an already politically defined situation, and the effect that Wolfinger finds (if it is not spurious) would hold only in ambiguous situations where the identification between the issues, or candidates, and the parties, is not very clear.

```
Table 24. Percentage Gain by Democratic Candidate and Net Activity Balance
of Democratic Over Republican Committeemen Nonpartisan City.

                         Net advantage of Democratic over Republican
                         Committeemen:

Percentage gain by          3 or 4  1 or 2     0     minus 1 or  minus 3 or
Democratic candidate:       points  points    ___    2 points    5 points

Majority effect included:     5.6     3.6      1.3    -1.1         -11.0

Majority effect removed:      0.2     2.4     -1.8    -1.1          -2.8

(N precincts)                 (6)    (13)     (13)    (8)           (4)


Source: Phillip Cutright, "Measuring the Impact of Local Party Activity on
the General Election Vote," Public Opinion Quarterly 1963, 27, 3, Fall,
372-336.  Table 6 in the text, p. 384.
```

The general conclusion is the same as the one regarding the effects of mass media. Precinct work is relevant for the undecided voter, or for issues or candidates that are not clearly related to political loyalties and to the main Political cleavages. In the era of mass communications and expert political salesmanship, it looks as if the voter is harder to change than he would seem to be.

b. Unstable Vote and High Turnout

To have a high level of turnout is, for the individual voter, an indication of a fairly high level of political participation and attitude stability. In aggregate terms, however, a high level of turnout can mean almost the opposite, namely the presence of a large number of unstable and erratic voters casting their ballots. Campbell (1964) refers to the evidence supposedly[**] collected by Stokes and Miller (1962) throughout the history of the United States that points in this direction. The evidence consists of the variation of voting turnout between the presidential elections and the so-called "off year," or midterm elections. Data from 1892 to 1960, says Campbell, show that variation in Republican votes in Presidential elections is over twice as great as the variation in Republican votes in the off-year elections, and that this effect exists, although smaller, even when only Congressional elections in the two types of election years are compared. The interpretation is that the presidential campaign, which is more spectacular and where the competition is harder, is more able to bring to vote the mass of voters that remain, in general, away from politics, but are attracted by the lights of the big political event. In another article (1966a) Campbell uses the expressions " surge " and "decline" to characterize the short-term variations in voting, and mainly the differences between Congressional and Presidential elections. The article by Stokes and Miller referred to above (1962) is a closer examination of the nature

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[**]Curiously, the Stokes and Miller article has no reference or mention of these data. The article is Stokes and Versen, in Elections and Political Order, pp. 180-193.

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of the Congressional vote, and the conclusions are in the same direction: since there is less personalization of the candidates, and the knowledge of Congressional activity by the voter is minimal, the Congressional vote is decided by party preferences, and the turnout is in general low.

Although it is a fact that presidential election years bring more voters to the pools than midterm elections, and that this marginal voter is very likely to be less stable than the partisan citizen, one may wonder whether the increase in turnout explains all the differences between the two types of votes.

For one thing, the variations in voting turnout can be smaller than the variations in the proportions of votes for each party — and this would mean that the same voters, presumably, have different voting patterns when it comes to vote for the President or for his Congressman. This difference is suggested by the authors of *The American Voter* when they say, at the beginning of their book, that 'in the presidential elections the individual voter is likely to have a better-developed image of the political actors he is asked to appraise." (p. 6.) This is an effect, presumably, of the focusing of the political campaign on the persons of the presidential nominees, and of the effect of the mass media that carry the campaign. We can speculate (we did not come across with many studies about this point in our review of the literature) that the differences are not a simple question of how perceptions are formed. Congressional elections are a more personal and localized affair (the voters have *their* congressmen, in the American political culture, while the president is, supposedly, the president of all the country), and a dissociation between the election of "my" representative and the election of the main national figure may exist: they could correspond roughly to the distinction Katz (1960) makes between utilitarian and value-expressive functions of attitudes. Or, if we prefer not to reintroduce the problem of rationality, discussed in part II, we could simply consider that congressional and in general local elections, are more prone to bring to play the weight of personal loyalties and commitments, cleavages of political as well as ethnic and religious nature, and so on. Compared to this, the voter in the presidential election is more free, knows less about the real differences among the candidates, and is more motivated. The evidence from the recent history of elections in Brazil (Barbosa 1963, and Orlando de Carvalho, 1960 and 1964) is that the dissociation between congressional and presidential vote became also a difference between a more conservative and a more leftist, or more liberal vote. And the dissociation of the voters lead to an actual dissociation between congress and president, at the beginning of the sixties, that ended up with elimination, by forceful means, of direct presidential elections in the country.

Interesting as this subject may be, let us examine the other side of the unattached voter, the radical.

VI. "The Voter Gets Loose ": 2) Radicalism

If social change, or the mobility of individuals in the society, commonly leads to low levels of political participation, the opposite consequence is also possible. Feelings of instability, an increasing gap between growing aspirations and actual possibilities of fulfilling them, or actual drops in the standard of life can lead to active political participation, in an effort to solve these problems *via* the government. It is very seldom that, in these circumstances, political activity could be carried on in a way that is integrated with the traditional norms of the political system. For one thing, these rapid increases in participation occur in periods of change where these norms are not compelling enough, the socialization to them is far from perfect, or they simply do not fit the new functional needs of the system.

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Second, if the mobility is of the individual, and not of the society as a whole, he will in general be cut off from the normal channels of political participation, or, in any case, he would lack the training and skill that are necessary for a continuously high level of political participation. Finally, social change can mean a change in values, and the individual or his group could come to the formulation of alternative sets of norms, or simply stop caring about them. In any case, the consequence is the type of political participation known as "radical," which brings usually three connotations: it is intense, it does not care much about the "rules of the game," and it aims at drastic changes in the social order.

The specific determinants of specific forms of radicalism are open to investigation, and this wide area of research could not be fully accounted for here. One typical kind of explanation is the status-inconsistency hypothesis we discussed before: when one's low status is ascribed (Negro) and the high status is achieved (education) it is possible to expect that society will be blamed for the inconsistency, and the consequence will be the increase in political participation. (The theory does not seem to hold well, however, when the high status is occupation, or income, that could lead to the "Uncle Tom" type of attitude.) Psychoanalytical types of explanation are also offered: situations of tension would lead to the projection of one's problems on the society, or to an identification with a victorious leader or an active political party. Other explanations go deeper into psychoanalytical mechanisms and link radicalism with patterns of child bearing that are prevalent in a given society. More macro-level explanations place the emergence of radicalism in situations where social improvements have lead to a rise in expectations that cannot be fully satisfied or, conversely, in situations of increasing exploitation.

Much of the conceptual confusion that these explanations represent is due, at least partially, to the lack of a clearer conception of the dependent variable they try to explain. Status-inconsistency theories refer usually to the increase of political participation, but sometimes also seek to explain why people become "liberal,' or "leftist." Studies on authoritarianism refer, generally, to a style of political participation, but also aim to explain the emergence of a given political orientation, the extreme right. These three dimensions of radicalism, intensity of participation, value content, or orientation, and the style of political participation are so often intermingled that a brief discussion of each of them separately seems to be in place.

a. Orientation: Left and Right

Much of the literature on political behavior is oriented toward the conceptualization and explanation of political orientations in terms of "left" and "right." " "Left" is usually equated with "liberal," "progressive' and "labor," while "right" " is equated with "conservative," "reactionary" and "bourgeois." In ideological terms, "left" has the connotations of state intervention in the private life, and an ideal of social organization that is placed in the future, whereas "right" (in its more moderate version) means a social and economic life free from state interference and, again in Mannheim' s terminology, an ideal society placed in the past. It is not difficult to trace these terms and their connotations to the political struggles in Europe since the French Revolution, and mainly during the XIX Century. Similar historical developments allow us to place the European Labor and Social Democratic parties at the left of the liberal, or conservative parties: the existence of the International Socialist, where the British Premier meets with the Premier from Sweden, makes this ideological assimilation easy. This does not mean, of course, that we could necessarily expect similarities between the policies of these governments solely because of this identification; and we should be even more doubtful about the existence of clear

political ideologies among the supporters of these parties or their opposites. We have seen, in our previous discussion, how only a small minority of the population is able to think politically in terms of structured ideologies."

In this general use the distinction between left and right, or their equivalents, is simply an abstraction, or a shorthand, for the characterization of the main political cleavages in a country. The usefulness of such an abstraction appears when we need, for comparative purposes, to equate the political cleavages, say, England and the United States, and thus place the Labor and the Democratic parties together. The validity of such an identification drops very rapidly when one moves away from Europe and from a political system polarized in terms of class. This is because the kind of cleavages that this left-right dimension grasps are simply one aspect of those traditional political attachments we discussed in parts II and III of this paper, the one related to class-cleavages.

If we bear in mind that much of the ideological radicalism that colors these cleavages falls within what Himmelstrand (1962) calls "expressive ideology," a mere sub-cultural ritual of opposition that does not lead to active action, we can say that left or right-wing radicalism with the other two connotations of authoritarian style and high political participation is a rather unusual form of political behavior. It appears in moments of individual and/or social crisis, it can shake or radically change either of them, or both, but then usually finds the path of progressive institutionalization.

Left and right is, thus, a partial account for one of the connotations of radicalism, the one related to the values, or the types of changes in the social order that are sought by the radical groups. These values usually encompass a "weltanschauung" that goes far beyond the political sphere. No listing of these values can be properly made so that an acceptable definition of "'leftist" or " rightist" ideology could be obtained, but table 25 is an indication of how such a listing could be.

b. Style: Tough and Tender

A specific type of psychoanalytical explanation, applied primarily to right wing orientations, is the much celebrated and debated theory of the "authoritarian personality,'" developed by Adorno and his associates. Although identified with a type of ideological orientation, the values of the right, the proximity between rightist ideologies and fascism brought another dimension into play which is mainly a question of political style: the lack of concern with the procedural values which define the rules of the political game, in a democratic context. The distinction between these two dimensions was suggested by Eysenck in terms of a newly introduced "tough-tender mindedness" dimension that would cut orthogonally the radical conservative, or left-right dimension of political orientation.

A good discussion of Eysenck's proposed factorization of political attitudes can be found in the chapter on *The Authoritarian Personality* of Roger Brown's *Social Psychology* (Free Press, 1965). Table 25, taken from this book, shows how Eysenck's dimension of "tender-mindedness" is not actually unidimensional, and how some items of the scale are consistently related to political ideologies.

In spite of the evidence against Eysenck, which Brown considers "deadly, Lipset (1959), among others, uses the term "authoritarianism" with a connotation that is much closer to a "tender tough" than

to a "left - right" dimension. His explanations of working class authoritarianism are generally based on the lack of political socialization that leads the lower classes to a lack of knowledge and lack of concern with the rules of politics. The identification that Lipset makes between this low level of socialization and the preference for "anti-democratic" ideologies is obviously unwarranted, if we consider our discussion on the sub-cultural characteristics of class cleavages.

More difficult to account for, however, is the systematic finding that lower classes score higher in the "Fascist" scale, originally developed for the identification of middle-class, rightist authoritarians. A possible explanation is that authoritarian types of families are more often found in the low strata of society, in spite of the original assumptions based on the European experience. But it is also possible to think that, while in the middle and high strata the support for authoritarian items in an "F" scale can mean a strong commitment with authoritarian values, in the lower classes the same attitude is much less central to the individual's personality. If this is so, in the first case authoritarianism could have a much higher and direct impact upon political activities than in the second case. The lack of a measure of "centrality" of the political attitudes--that means, the degree to which these attitudes are relevant to the individual's personality--has been a serious handicap in the often confusing discussion on leftism, authoritarianism, tough-mindedness, alienation, radicalism and other concepts of the same bag.

Table 25. Frequency of Responses by Conservatives, Liberals and Socialists and Communists to the Items of the Tender-Mindedness Scale. Working-Class Respondents.

	Proportion of "yes" answers:			
	Conservative	Liberal	Socialist	Communist
Item and Direction of Scoring:				
a. Items on which Communists are most tender-minded:				
1.Colored people are: innately inferior to white people (T-)	30%	33%	16%	06%
3. War is inherent to human nature: (T-)	70	67	60	02
5. Persons with serious hereditary defects and diseases should be compulsorily sterilized (T-)	96	83	89	71
8. In the interests of peace, we should give up part of our national sovereignty (T)	37	38	50	65
10. It is wrong that men should be permitted greater sexual freedom than women by society (T)	74	78	76	91
13. Conscientious objectors are traitors to their country and should be treated accordingly (T-)	67	22	27	06
36. The death penalty is barbaric, and should be abolished (T)	19	11	20	83
39. The Japanese are by nature a cruel people	74	44	27	06

```
Table 25 (cont).


                                            Proportion of "yes" answers:

                         Conservative  Liberal   Socialist    Communist

 Item and Direction of
 Scoring:

 b. Items on which
 Communists are most
 tough-minded:

 9. Sunday-observance is     59            33        69           90
 old-fashioned and should
 cease to govern our
 behavior (T-)

 15.The law against abortion 33            11        51           65
 should be abolished (T-)

 23. Divorce laws should be  37            22        53           91
 altered to make divorce
 easier (T-)

 28. It is right and proper  70            78        13           05
 that religious education in
 schools should be
 compulsory (T)

 29. Men and women have the: 37            22        36           77
 right to find out whether
 they are sexually suited
 before marriage (T-)
```

Source: Roger Brown, *Social Psychology*, The Free Press, 1965, p. 540.
Taken from table: 10-4. The original source is Rokeach and
Hanley,"Eysenck's Tender-mindedness Dimension: A critique," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1956, 53, pp. 169-176.

c. Intensity: Charismatic and Symbolic Vote

If the voter is not a professional politician, a high intensity of political motivation is bound to be an expression of a personal anxiety which is projected into the political sphere. The typical authoritarian of the Adorno study falls within this type, and a more general, although less empirical conceptualization of these projections can be found in the article by Franz Neumann, "Anxiety and Politics," (Stein and White, ed., *Identity and Anxiety*, Free Press, 1960) as well as in the article of Lasswell in the Janowitz and Berelson book on *Public Opinion and Communications* (Free Press, 1963). The debate on the validity of the psychoanalytical approach is obviously beyond the scope of this paper, but, even if we accept that these mechanisms operate and can explain much of the political behavior of single individuals, it is doubtful that they can explain massive manifestations of apparently

"neurotic" kinds of political behavior. For instance, even if we accept that a given type of family structure, common in Germany, is bound to produce fascist mentalities, the problem of knowing why Nazism appeared in the thirties, and not before or after, remains unsolved.

The fascist syndrome is very peculiar, in the sense that it combines high levels of political participation, the concentration of this political cathexis in a personal leader and the national symbols, and a rapid change of political allegiances in the country. It differs very sharply from the typical European Communism, where the strong interpenetration of party and class organization, and the absence of charismatic leadership allowed, in general, the institutionalization of the radical party into a kind of political cultural subgroup, as in the examples of Finland, Italy and France. Fascism brings always the connotation of a political landslide that destroys and actually is incompatible with the existence of institutionalized rules of the political game, to which the European Communists were so able to adapt themselves.

More frequent than the full fascist syndrome is, however, one of its aspects: the political landslide provoked by a political figure who is able to wash out the previous political cleavages and allegiances that existed in the society. One of the most extreme recent examples of this type of political charisma was the election of Jânio Quadros as the President of Brazil in 1960--a victory based on personal prestige, with explicit disregard for the political parties or political issues, and an exclusive stress on the candidate's qualities of personal honor and honesty. The political rise of De Gaulle, as the end of the French IV Republic, is another example of the same type of phenomena, and table 26 gives an idea of the kinds of motivations that were behind his support or opposition.

```
Table 26.  The De Gaulle Image.
                                    % of positive  % of negative
                                    references     references


          General references           9               3
          Personal image             47              34
          Leadership capacities      18              13
          Record around World War II 14              13
          Recent record               4               5
          Hopes (fears) for future    4              15
          Policy positions            3              15
          Group references            1               2


                 Total              100             100


Source: Phillip Converse and G Dupeux, "De Gaulle and Eisenhower - The Public
Image of the Victorious General," in Campbell, et al., Elections and the
Political Order, 1966, pp. 292-345.
```

The polarization is visible. To support De Gaulle is to support the man, but to be against him can mean to be not only against the man, but also against his policy, or how the future state of affairs could become with him. The 30% of the opposition to De Gaulle on these grounds (as against only 7% of support on the same grounds) can be seen as the last pocket of resistance against the personalization

of politics which already includes, in the sample, more than 50% of those that are against the political figure.

Can we interpret the rise of De Gaulle, or the election of Quadros, as a consequence of high levels of political cathexis? The answer seems to be simultaneously no and yes. Actually, only a low concern, and a low amount of personal involvement in politics can lead the voter to be so sensitive to charismatic appeals and so impressed by the personality of public figures. It is exactly because the levels of political involvement are usually so low that the voter can move from his political allegiances and to behave in a way that represents his more direct and immediate feeling about a political system he does not understand and never cared much about. The condition for this change, however, is a crisis in the political system, or the sudden salience of a new political issue that cuts across the usual political cleavages. In this situation the voter feels suddenly motivated to participate and to express his feelings, but his competence is low and his usual sources of reference appear as unreliable. The translation of the political problems into differences of personality is a common answer for this lack of orientation. The combination of extreme intensity of participation in small militant groups and widespread low participation, in a situation of crisis, is undoubtedly the best recipe for the fascist types of political outbursts. In this situation the mass media become powerful, traditional attachments irrelevant, and all the regularities of political behavior studied for periods of political normality cannot be expected to hold.

VII. Aggregate Analysis

We have been mainly concerned, throughout this paper, with the attitudes and behavior of the individual voter, and there is little doubt that the direct approach provided by the survey technique is the most suitable for this purpose. Occasionally, however, it has been useful to make use of aggregate data, that can perform two main functions. The first is a function of economy: aggregate data are already collected and, when properly handled (Allardt's study of Finnish radicalism is a good example of this) can yield much of the same kind of information that the more direct kind of approaches do. But aggregate analysis can be used not only as second best, but also on its own merits. To move from a microscopic to a macroscopic perspective helps to bring the mechanisms of vote, which we have discussed so far, back to their context and, in a way, to "reintroduce politics" in the study of politics. As a conclusion, let us glance at two major areas of aggregate analysis.

a. Long-Term Analysis

A few recent studies have been done on the historical trends of the voting patterns in the United States. Starting from a system of limited enfranchisement and high participation, through the 19th Century, the historical tendency has been one of increasing enfranchisement and progressive lower levels of turnout as reported by Burnham (1965). Other measures of low participation are also presented in the article ("roll-off," "drop-off," and split-ticket), and this reduction of participation, in quantity as well as quality, is considered by the author as a sign of a malaise of the American political system. He addresses himself to the question of the ways of "returning to the 19th Century levels" of participation, without suggesting, however, the necessity of disenfranchisement of the population.

More interesting than these overall tendencies and their consequences for normative politics are, for us, the historical variations that can be found both in the levels of participation and in the orientations of the national electorate. Sellers (1965) charters the distribution of votes for the two parties along the history of the United States, and is able to show the existence of a pendulum-like movement that leads to a theory of an Equilibrium cycle, which the author generalizes for the two-party type of politics. He distinguishes three periods in the cycle, a period of realignment, one of ascendency, and a period of equilibrium. The explanations which are offered for the changes do not follow from the data, and the author does not make use of other historical data either. He mentions the existence of historical changes, including migrations that alter the shape of the political alignments, but also refer to changes that occur in the "images that the parties project, the ways in which they do it, and the ways in which the voter perceives the parties...." The explanations for equilibrium are more specific: it is suggested that, in a two-party system, a majority of 51% is good enough, and any increase above this minimum tends to alienate some of the groups in the coalition, rendering it unstable and creating defections to the other side.

These oscillations of voting preferences are not, of course, a recent discovery, and Campbell (1964 and 1966, Chapter 4) have proposed a classification of elections in terms of their relation with the expected "normal" vote. This classification is re-elaborated by Pomper (1967) who is able, by an intelligent manipulation of the election statistics, to characterize each of the elections in the history of the United States according to their type (maintaining, deviating, converting and realigning elections), and give objective measures for his classification Realigning elections are defined as those where both the government loses and the voting pattern of the electorate is not consistent with the previous elections. Only four instances of these elections are found, one at the beginning of the 19th Century (the Van Buren election of 1836), the other in 1896, the election after the Great Depression and, finally, the Kennedy-Johnson elections.

The political realignment of the 1890's is extensively discussed in the Burnham article, and three main causes of the failure of the Democratic Party are presented. One is the effect of the economic crisis that hit the Democratic Administration and the unpopularity that came with it. The second factor was that the Democratic campaign, and its platform, were weighed toward the interests and needs of an "essentially rural and semi-colonial clientele." The third factor, related to this one, is the polarization that was created between the white, Protestant and Anglo-Saxon sectors of society and the new-coming mass of immigrants. This polarization meant a confrontation between the North and the South of the country, and Burnham compares the result of it with the result of the Goldwater election.

The new realignment would last until the end of the twenties. Figures on turnout, and on drop-off, show that the voters have started losing interest in politics in the twenties, when the polarization of the late nineteenth century lost, it would seem, much of its meaning. A new economic crisis, the necessity of governmental intervention in the problems brought by the recession, all the New Deal atmosphere, in short, set the frame for what would be the American political climate for the next thirty years. The differences between the two parties have blurred since then, but the electorate is still able to think of the Republican as favorable to "business" and of the Democrats as favorable to "workers," and in general more "liberal." We have already seen how these class differentiations play only a small role in American politics, and one may wonder whether the persistence of these differences

in images is, today, less an account of actual differences than a product of the necessity of somehow justifying a choice that is taken on other grounds.

The meaning of the contemporary realignment is not very clear. The change in the correlation of the votes by state, which is Pomper's indication of realignment, can well be an effect of population movements and other secular trends that do not mean a deep reshaping of the political universe. But it is also possible to think that the gap between the party affiliations and the actual issues these affiliations supposedly represent is widening since the last realignment thirty years ago, and a new redefinition of the political universe is about to occur. The hypothesis is that, in spite of the low concern of the voters with political issues, and the observed dependence of the attitudes regarding issues on party identification, there are some limits for the gap between party-induced attitudes and the real social problems that a society is living. This gap eventually leads to crises which bring discontinuities in the political process, and these discontinuities, rather than cyclical movements, seem to be the better explanation for the changing shape of American politics. It is difficult to foresee when this crisis will occur, or even if it will ever get the form of a single and identifiable event. But it is very likely that a new redefinition of political cleavages is about to occur, and issues such as racial conflict, foreign policy, the Great Society and educational policy will become the main cleaves of political opinion.

b. Voting and Socio-political Development

The other area of aggregate analysis, and the last item in this paper, refers to the relations between voting and social and political development. The difficulty of obtaining time series of data for the developing countries has led to the alternative of working with many countries at the same point of time, instead of many points of time for the same point in space. In spite of the obvious fallacy, it is possible to array the countries along a continuum of "stages" of development, and to compare these stages with political characteristics of the units or, more specifically, with voting. Perhaps the most well known of these analyses is the one of Bruce Russet and his associates (Russet, 1964). They distinguish five stages of economic and political development, for a total of 107 countries, that are ordered along their per capita income levels, which are correlated, among other things, with urbanization, literacy, higher education, inhabitants per physician, communications and voting turnout (pp.293 ff.).

Russet's indicator for voting turnout is a ratio between turnout and voting-age population, regardless of the legal limitations on enfranchisement that might exist in the different countries. The Communist countries are obviously ranked higher on his list, African and Arab countries are at the bottom, and the Anglo-Saxon countries lie between the second (New Zealand and Australia) to the fourth (United States) range deciles of the distribution. Some correlations of voting turnout can be seen in table 27.

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Table 27. Some Correlates of Voting Turnout.

                                            Pearson's "r"      (N)

        Employees of the General Government
        as % of working-age population             .78          (16)
        Expenditure of General Government as
        % of GNP                                   .66          (26)
        Revenue of General Government as
        % of GNP                                   .64          (27)
        Votes for non-communist
        secular parties                            .59          (57)
        Marriages per population                   .57          (43)
        Annual growth of GNP per capita            .55          (63)
        Life expectancy                            .55          (63)
        Communist vote                             .54          (44)
        Primary and secondary school pupils
        as percentage of population                .53          (96)
        Newspaper circulation                      .52          (93)
        Radios per capita                          .51          (92)
        % of GNP originating in
        agriculture:                              -.50          (63)
        GNP per capita                             .46          (87)

Source: Russet et al., World Handbook of Social and Political Indicators,
Yale Univ. Press, 1964.  Taken from Table B1, p. 270.
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In spite of the variations in the number of cases, which render the differences between these correlations highly unreliable, a general picture of the context of voting turnout can be drawn from the table. Voting is only partially a function of development, it is highly related to the relative weight of the government in the society (data for the first three correlations exclude the Communist countries) and depends on the development of mass media.

A further elaboration of these data (table 28) is presented by H. Alker in his *Mathematics and Politics* (Alker 1965). The 26 non-communist countries for which there are data of governmental expenditures are divided into two levels of development, and the partial correlations between expenditures and voting are examined.

The interpretation is that, in the developed countries, voting has come to a ceiling of participation which does not increase with further development or further participation of the state in society; but, in an underdeveloped context, the growth of the state is followed by an increase in political participation and an enlargement of the franchise. In Alker's words, "underdevelopment *increases* the worldwide correlation between voting and expending by .12 to .53 while development *decreases* the universal figure to about one-eighth of its previous value." (p. 96.)

The interpretation of this finding in terms of changes in time is the usual attempt to supply the lack of historical data with the temporal interpretation of a sample of contemporary units. The interpretation can go further. The ceiling of turnout in the developed countries is not very high (it

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remains between 65% and 85% for the 14 most developed countries in Russet's classification, with an average of 77.8%) and the tendency seems to be that, the higher the development, the lower the turnout (the rank-correlation between vote and per capita income is -.26 for these i\4 countries). It is as if, when social stability is achieved bringing to the citizen a fair level of personal security, which is perceived as unable to be disturbed by political storms, the process of institutional differentiation and mass participation, which started two hundred years ago, moves a step further. From participation in a differentiated political sphere, the move is toward the final dissociation between private life and public matters. And this tendency can be interpreted either as leading to a progressive alienation of politics in favor of technocracy, or as leading to better forms of participation, from the local community upwards, than what we have seen throughout this paper.

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Table 28. Development, Voting Turnout and Government Expenditures, 26
Countries.


                         High  Development              Low  Development

              High Voting       Low Voting      High Voting      Low Voting

High          UK, France,       Canada,         Italy,           Burma, Japan,
Expenses      New Zealand,      Ireland,        Austria          South Africa
              Netherlands,      Finland
              Belgium,
              Norway, Sweden

Low           Denmark,          United States                    Portugal,
Expenses:     Austria                                            Spain,
                                                                 Greece,
                                                                 Brazil
                                                                 Pakistan,
                                                                 India,
                                                                 Jamaica


Source: Hayward Alker, Mathematics and Politics, Yale Univ., 1965. Taken
from table 5.2, p. 91.
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This is one of the values of aggregate analysis: to provide the elements for speculations that seem to be the higher the smaller the sample and the worse the data....

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