EDUCATION
IN LATIN AMERICA: A PERSPECTIVE FROM BRAZIL Simon
Schwartzman
Lecture given at the School of Education, University
of California at Los Angeles, February 23, 1989.
Education in Latin America tends to be of poor quality, strongly stratified
in socioeconomic terms, and resistant to improvement. The challenge to anyone
concerned with this field is to understand not only these limitations, but
also why so many attempts at educational reform and educational improvement
fail. Even when the answer seems obvious - when there is not enough money,
projects are ill conceived, administrators are corrupt and unmotivated -
there is still the question of why Latin American societies are so frequenty
unable to muster the resources, competence, motivation and seriousness of
purpose which were brought together in other places and times. To say that
the reason lies in some traits of the "Latin culture" is wholly incorrect,
but it is too vague, can easily lead racist arguments, and in any case does
not account for the fact that there are enough counter examples of achievement
and success, both in Europe and in Latin America, to place any kind of generalized
cultural or racial explanation to rest.
The proper answer, I believe, should be historical and comparative. The
establishment of national systems of education in Europe, as Margaret Archer
has shown, was the outcome of the interplay between different kinds of educational
movements in society -- be they linguistic, religious or economically motivated
-- and the gradual building up of the national states, with different outcomes
according to the relative strength of the parts involved(1)
. We can assume that the same happened in Latin America, and the characteristics
of the region's educational systems should also to be understood as resulting
from of the ways by which State and society related to each other in the
organization of the region's nation states. In the following, I will look
into the Brazilian case with some detail in order to substantiate what,
for me, is the central feature of the region's national education systems:
namely, that Latin American national systems of education emerged without
a corresponding demand from significant groups in society, and some times
against them; and because of that, they remained limited in size, and without
the internal drive which is essential for quality(2).
If I look back at my own work on the establishment of scientific traditions
and higher education in Brazil, I can see it as an effort to understand
and spell out this pattern, as well as its consequences for the learning
institutions in the region.
* * *
My starting point, as a political scientist, was not directly related to
questions of science or education. Writing in the early seventies, I asked
myself why political life in Brazil, and by extension in most Latin America,
did not conform to the standard theories which explain political outcomes
by the interplay of class or class-like interest groups. Why was there so
little collective action and that which some political scientists used to
call "public-regardness" on part of society, in spite of dire needs; and
why was the public sector, the State, so powerful and at the same time so
incompetent or unwilling to establish long-range policies, or even to stabilize
itself on time?
The answer I came up with can be briefly summarized like this(3). The standard Weberian-like interpretation of
political modernization of Western societies assumed an interplay between
an emerging bourgeoisie and centralized political systems, resulting in
different forms of legal-rational political domination. This process of
state rationalization occurred together with a general breakdown of traditional
patterns of social interaction and labor relations, replaced by modern forms
of class interactions and market rationality.
In Latin America, however - and I dare say, in most non-Western societies
- modernization also occurred, but along very different lines. It is not
that they lacked the ingredients that were present in Europe - a rising
bourgeoisie, a centralized State, a growing proletariat, educated elites
of different kinds. They existed, but in different proportions, and combined
in dissimilar ways. Because the way these societies were formed -- in the
absence of feudal and aristocratic traditions, and the presence of complex
and fairly rationalized colonial administrations and their successors --
capitalism was always dependent on mercantilism. Administrative centers
and "non-Western" cities were established independently of industries or
the typical European urban corporations, leading to population concentration
and the emergence of "dangerous classes" around the centers of power and
wealth.
Following the Weberian tradition, I have tried to characterize the alternatives
for political action and interaction in such societies in terms of the dominance
of a pattern of political patrimonialism, or neo-patrimonialism, over contract-based
interactions. For Weber, patrimonialism was a term reserved for the interpretation
of political domination in traditional societies. It was the ideal-typical
antithesis of feudalism, which implied an element of social contract which
patrimonialism lacked. Weber talked also about "bureaucratic patrimonialism",
a concept akin to Marx's notion of "Asiatic societies", which tried to account
for the peculiarities of large Imperial societies which did not follow the
European patterns of social and political modernization which later became
accepted as standard. What neither Marx nor Weber did was to follow the
path of these societies into modern times, and see how they incorporated
several rational features of contemporary civilization - huge bureaucracies,
modern weapons, systems of mass communication, modern science and technology
- without bringing in its elements of contract and individualization, landmarks
of the bourgeois revolution. Or, in other words, how they became national
without being legal(4).
Centralized patrimonialism was dominant in Brazil since its beginnings as
a Portuguese colony. But, like any centralized system, it had to deal with
centrifugal forces. Localism and isolation, on one hand; and a competitive
pattern of social and political organization which was closer to the European
experience of entrepreneurial capitalism, and centered mostly around the
region of São Paulo(5). The product of this
interaction can be described, as some authors have done, in terms of "conservative
modernization", or modernization from above, which is very different from
describing it as "traditional", "underdeveloped" or culturally peculiar
in some way. It would impossible to spell out here all the implications
of this condition. We can get some of its flavor, however, if we remember
that Brazil never had a nobility worth of this designation, the Catholic
Church has been almost always submissive to the civilian authorities, the
rich have always depended on the favors of the government, and the poor,
of its eventual magnanimity. The point is not that, in Brazil, the state
has been everything, and society, nothing; but that their relationship was
one of either of submission or distrust, and most often both. The consequence
was the combination of a heavy, powerful but usually inefficient and incompetent
bureaucracy, and a weak, scared, and often rebellious and treacherous civil
society.
* * *
I started my research on the development of the scientific community in
Brazil with these ideas on the background, but without any preconceived
notion on how they would relate with the new subject. At the end, I realized
not only that they were closely related, but that it would be impossible
to understand how institutions of science and higher education could emerge
and develop the way they did without having a proper grasp of the country's
broader pattern of social and political modernization.
In fact, Brazilian institutions of science and higher education were, from
the beginning, part of a peculiar project of modernization from above which
started in Portugal at the end of the 18th Century, and was transplanted
to Brazil after independence. It was a deliberate effort to free the old
Portuguese empire from the grips of Catholic restoration and conservatism,
and get the benefits brought about by the spreading industrial revolution,
without, however, any major incorporation of new sectors in the ruling circles,
or any major social and economic change. Throughout Western Europe, the
political modernization responded to pressures from raising social groups,
and was mediated by different sorts of professional corporations - lawyers,
the military, engineers, university professors, scientists - which were
responsible for the progressive rationalization and institutionalization
of the new political order. Portugal, however, as well as Spain, did not
participate in the great religious and cultural upheavals which marked the
end of the European middle ages, and never developed the strong professional,
academic or religious corporations which were present in different degrees
in societies such as Britain, France or the German states. Those learning
institutions which did exist -- like the old Spanish universities in Latin
America, or the whole Jesuit establishment, from the Indian settlements
to their schools and seminars - were taken as the enemy to be fought by
the modernizing elites.
Brazilian enlightened elites, like their counterparts in other Latin American
countries, entered the 19th century admiring and copying the French opposition
to all forms of corporatist arrangements and privileges, above all those
of the Church and of the traditional universities(6)
The independence wars in Latin America were not, however, the French Revolution,
and the Catholic Church was able to survive and keep much of its influence
in the Continent until the present day. But they were strong enough to give
raise to different versions of the Napoleonic system of higher education
in most countries, and to take away from the Church most of its role as
the educator of modern elites. When, in Brazil, the first professional schools
were created in the early 19th Century, they were meant to be institutions
for training cadres for the public service - for the military forces, the
engineering corps, the hospitals and the handling of legal affairs - and
lacked both the professional and the university traditions which were the
building blocks upon which the modernization of Western university systems
took place(7). They also lacked the pressures
for performance and competence which would be required in conditions of
intense competition for social mobility. Latin American enlightened elites
were able to speak French, to travel to Europe and handle French concepts,
including their democratic and rationalist ideals; their societies, however,
remained restricted to the limits of their economies, based on a few export
products, large pockets of traditional or decadent settlements, one or two
major administrative and export centers, and, in the case of Brazil, a slavery
system which lasted almost to the end of the 19th Century. The consequence
of this double jeopardy was the generalized lack of intellectual and institutional
vigour which characterized most of the scientific and higher education institutions
in the region throughout the 19th century.
The dawn of the 20th century meant for Brazil the beginning of Republican
decentralization, the end of slavery, the intensification of European migration
to São Paulo and other southern states, and significant changes in the country's
scientific and higher education institutions. Middle sectors started to
emerge and demand more educational opportunities; there was a concrete challenge
to be met by the central authorities through the use of modern science,
the infectious diseases which raged in the country's main cities and ports,
leading to the creation of several research centers in Tropical medicine.
A new pragmatic and modernizing mentality emerged among the industrial and
agricultural elites in the São Paulo region, which gained political supremacy
with the Republic and created their own scientific and teaching institutions.
Intellectual and political competition among elites in the old Republican
period was not between tradition vs. modernity, or capitalist pragmatism
vs. feudal aristocracy, but between two strands of enlightenment and modernization;
one based on the control of the State administration, believing in the strength
of positivist ideas and in the redeeming role of illustrated elites; the
other based on an expanding private economy, believing more in the strength
of money and entrepreneurship, the practical usefulness of technical knowledge,
and the value of political decentralization. This is of course an oversimplification,
which does not take into account, for instance, those who were not enlightened
in any of these senses. However, it should be enough to make our main point,
namely that neither side carried the values and motivations which would
allow for the emergence of consolidated institutions for scientific research
and higher learning. The Brazilian first universities would only emerge
in the 1930's, as well as the first outline of a national system of basic
and secondary education.
* * *
Between 1889 and the 1930's the Brazilian central government grew in size
and relative weight, organized and modernized its armed forces, and took
increasing responsibilities in the handling of the country's economy. For
the military, the engineers and many intellectuals in the main cities, there
was an obvious contradiction between this tendency and the political arrangement
which placed so much power in the hands of regional oligarchies of the large
states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul. This was also the
period in which the State of São Paulo grew and modernized more than any
other region in the country. In the late 1930's it was already responsible
for 40% of the country's total industrial production, and was the main producer
and exporter of agricultural goods. Population in the state went from 2.3
to 5.8 million, and the state capital went from 240 to 887 thousand in the
same period. A significant part of this modernization and growth is related
with the arrival of large numbers of immigrants from Italy, Portugal, Spain,
Japan, Germany, Russia and other countries. 4.2 million immigrants entered
Brazil between 1880 and the 1930's, half of those to São Paulo. Another
3.1 million came to São Paulo from other Brazilian states in the same period(8)
This kind of development did not require a university or basic research
institutes, but could make use of good engineers, better knowledge about
industrial processes and agricultural production, and generated enough money
to pay for the professional skills of medical doctors and competent lawyers.
Immigrants from Europe and Japan brought with them traditions of popular
education and the urge to keep their identity through the study of their
original language and culture, adding an element of grass-roots education
which Brazil had not seen before.
The confrontation between the two modernizing tendencies was unavoidable,
and it came about with the establishment of the Vargas regime in 1930, which
was to last until 1945: on one hand, the Republican positivists, Napoleonic
in inspiration, and fascinated with the authoritarian regimes which, on
the left or on the right, seemed to represent the future of Europe; on the
other, the Republican federalists with their territorial basis in the São
Paulo region. Again, however, this was not Europe. The Vargas regime had
to build its support among local oligarchies in the country's poorer regions
which have always been clients to the central government, while the Paulistas
seemed at times to personify the conservative reaction against the modernizing
drives of the center.
It would be impossible, and besides the point, to try to account for all
the intricacies and complexities of the power play which took place in Brazil
in those years. For our purpose, it is enough to point out that the central
government's fascination with European totalitarianism was not enough to
allow for the development of significant fascist movements and organizations,
but included an alliance with the conservative and militant Catholic Church,
which found a renewed space in Brazilian politics after several decades
of political ostracism and relative marginality. The Paulista elite, after
its defeat in a bloody regional insurrection in 1932, decided to give up
political confrontation for the control of public offices, and to look instead
for pragmatic accommodations with those sectors in the central government
dealing with economic and financial matters.
This political scenario had direct consequences for the country's learning
institutions. The first legislation allowing for the establishment of a
national university in Rio de Janeiro came out in 1931, written by Francisco
Campos, the country's first Minister of Education and the man who masterminded
the political alliance between Getúlio Vargas and the Catholic Church(9).
In 1934 the Ministry of Education was placed in the hands of Gustavo Capanema,
with a mandate to carry on the educational orientations of the Church. His
ambitious national plan for education included the materialization of the
National University in Rio de Janeiro, which was to be staffed with conservative
Catholics from France and Italy, and to be controlled by the Ministry through
minute regulations of all its administrative and teaching activities; the
creation of nationally supervised system of secondary education with emphasis
in Latin and the humanities, adapted from Italy, as the only channel for
university education; the establishment of a nation-wide system of four
years primary education, to be carried out by the states according to the
federal legislation, with mandatory religious and civic courses; a network
of technical and vocational schools at the secondary level, for those who
could or would not enter gymnasiums; and even a technical university for
the teaching of engineering, chemistry and related topics.
Such an ambitious plan could not be developed in the vacuum. The project
for a National University faced opposition from the São Paulo elites, who
wanted to create their own university, and from the left wing of the Vargas
coalition, which also organized their own institution, the Universidade
do Distrito Federal in Rio de Janeiro. The U.D.F. emerged under the auspices
of the Rio de Janeiro government, and brought together most of the outstanding
liberal intellectuals and academics from Rio and other regions in the country,
identified with the causes of progress, modernization, opposition to fascism
and conservative Catholicism. As the government turned openly to the right
in 1935, the university's first unit, the Faculdade de Ciências, came under
intervention, and was closed a few years later. The University of São Paulo,
established in 1934, was from the beginning too strong to be destroyed or
subdued. It brought together all the state's "faculties" in the liberal
professions and a few research institutes, and was centered in a newly created
school of Philosophy, Sciences and Letters, fully staffed by European professors
- physicists and mathematicians from Italy, biologists and chemists from
Germany, historians, geographers and social scientists from France. In the
end, the project for a national university failed in its ambitions, but
led to a tradition of administrative centralization and formalism in academic
matters which still plagues Brazilian higher education. The attempt to maintain
a strictly confessional university under public auspices also failed, since
the marriage between Church and State was an affair of convenience, never
of conviction. In the forties the Catholic Church returned to its privatist
tradition, and created its first Pontifical University in Rio de Janeiro.
The University of São Paulo suffered through the Vargas years in its relations
with the Federal government and their representatives in the state, but
gave rise to Brazil's only major public alternative to the Federal system,
which is today the largest and by far the best university in the country.
At the other extreme, the Federal government's policy for basic education
was mostly restrictive. The development of community schools in foreign
languages among European and Japanese immigrants from São Paulo down to
the South was perceived with suspicion by the government, and, when Brazil
finally joined the allies in Second World War, teaching in other languages
besides Portuguese was forbidden and forcefully suppressed. A pedagogic
movement towards universal education, which was known as the "movement for
new education" and received inspiration, among others, from John Dewey in
the United States, was perceived with deep suspicion by the Church, and
its initiatives thwarted after 1935. The Ministry of Education engaged in
a bitter dispute with industrialists about the control of technical education,
which resulted in some kind of Salomonic decision, with the creation of
two parallel systems. The federal government went as far as to hire specialists
in Switzerland for their first technical schools, an experience which was
mostly a disaster; in the meantime, the industrialists developed their own
network of technical schools which still provides them with the skilled
labor they need.
Classic secondary education has always been limited to a few public gymnasiums
or "colleges" in the main cities, and in a series of Catholic institutions
for boys and girls, which together catered to the children of the richest
families and of high-ranking politicians and civil servants, a situation
not deeply affected by the Capanema legislation. At the same time, a series
of less academic institutions started to emerge, including a fairly large
number of four year "escolas de comércio" (schools of commerce"), leading
to three year "cursos de contabilidade" (accounting), which did not qualify
for university admission. It was impossible to maintain for long the monopoly
of university education for the graduates of the traditional secondary eschools,
and on time all recipients of school certificates corresponding to 11 years
of education were formally allowed to apply to the university's entrance
examinations. In fact, however, these examinations tested for the kinds
of knowledge only the best traditional schools could provide.
* * *
Fifty years later, Brazil is a much larger and complex society, with an
education system several times bigger, and in many ways very different from
that of the 1930's. And yet, as population expanded, social mobility increased
and the educational system had to face the incorporation of new social groups,
it could only count on the institutions established in the past.
Public elementary (7-11)(10) education expanded
everywhere, and access to first grade is finally becoming universal; but
quality is very uneven, and wastage through desertion and failure is staggering.
In general, schools are much better in the regions with a strong immigrant
and capitalist tradition than in the rest of the country, including Rio
de Janeiro. Although lack of resources is still a serious concern, the main
difficulties with Brazilian basic education are its inability to keep students
from lower socioeconomic strata at school after the first year or two, the
lack of community involvement and support for the local schools, and the
formality and emptiness of the curricula(11).
Part of the explanation for these difficulties, I believe, is related to
the tradition of perceiving education a service to be provided from "above",
the state, rather than something to acquired from "below", society. For
the lower strata, this service is often not only inaccessible, but also
incomprehensible. The large state networks of public schools developed into
huge bureaucracies, with hundreds of thousands of teachers, administrators
and supervisors, which are often used as an instrument of political patronage,
and resist any attempts to build up local motivation and involvement with
matters of education. No significant improvement of basic education in the
country seems feasible without a major effort to return the initiative to
the local communities, and to break down its bureaucratized and overly politicized
bureaucracies.
The crucial problems of secondary education are its permanence as a screening
device to higher education, its loss of meaning as a place for general education(12),
and the absence of education alternatives to the traditional curriculum.
Latin disappeared, geography and history were replaced by social studies,
French became elective, and the 15-18 secondary school became mostly a cramming
course for university entrance examinations. The small, elite public secondary
schools (such as the Pedro II in Rio de Janeiro, or the Colégio Estadual
in Minas Gerais) lost their prestige and quality, and secondary education
became mostly a private affair, leading to an extremely regressive selective
mechanism for the country's public universities. Attempts to develop vocational
education at the secondary level failed almost completely, probably because
they meant in practice a dead end on the road to the universities.
Problems of higher education can be described in terms of exacerbated credentialism,
extreme qualitative inequality and the lack of differentiation(13)
Public higher education remained divided around the Federal and the São
Paulo systems, the first more bureaucratized, with relatively little research,
the second with one small research university, Campinas, a large agglomeration
of unrelated professional "faculties", the Universidade do Estado de São
Paulo (UNESP), and the country's largest and best public university, USP.
The main cleavage, however, is not between the federal and the state systems,
but between the public and the growing private higher education institutions.
Demand for higher education gained speed in the sixties and seventies, and
today 75% of higher education students (more than 90% in São Paulo) are
in private institutions. We know very little about what these institutions
do, and why people are willing to pay for the courses they provide. Their
quality is usually poor, but we suspect that this is just as well for a
large part of their students, more interested in their diplomas than in
good quality courses they would find hard to follow in any case.
Credentialism is not a Brazilian exclusivity, but it has been intensified
by the extraordinary wage differentials which exist between educated and
non-educated in the labor market. It would be reasonable to expect that,
as the number of diplomas increase much quicker than the number of well-paying
jobs, this gap would tend to close, reducing the demand for education at
the lowest paying careers. However, wage differentials are kept high by
a complex combination of legislation and employment practices, mostly in
the public service, and the general expectation is that they could be kept
high by the organized collective action of professional groups. The consequence
is that, the lower the salaries get, the more emphasis is placed on the
formal and credential features of the higher education system, at the expense
of its contents. This is a direct inheritance from the tradition of state
centralization, and is a powerful obstacle to a presumably more effective
tactic, which would be to try to increase salaries through the improvement
of skills and productivity.
A similar mechanism operates with the network of higher education institutions.
They are highly stratified in terms of quality and earning opportunities
for graduates, but are kept nominally unified within a single national model,
with strong opposition to any suggestions that differentiation should be
acknowledged and acted upon, providing different sectors and types of institution
with the education more adapted to their demands and possibilities.
* * *
In brief, I believe that the central problems of education in Brazil, and
by extension of many Latin American countries, are related to a condition
of extreme inequality and lack of quality under the guise of equality for
all, maintained as such by huge bureaucratic and over-politicized structures
which defeat most attempts at effective reform. The route to change, if
there is any, is to open the way for substantive improvement in quality
through the recognition of actual differences and the breakdown of bureaucratic
monopolies at all levels. The explanation of the current situation is at
least partly to be found in the relative early emergence of large state
structures, heirs of the old mercantilist and colonial administration, which
preempted and co-opted society's drives for self-reliance and initiative,
in education as well as in other matters.
I think it would be naive, however, to believe that all the problems would
be solved if the public systems were just closed down, and education turned
over to pressures from the market. Karl Polanyi showed long ago that markets
only work well within well defined institutional settings, a lesson which
could only bet forgotten at our own peril. Latin American education is already
privatized to a large extent, a condition which does not seem to be improving
it in any significant way. What we need is effective social policies under
society's close supervision - but this may be already asking too much.
Notes
1. Margaret Archer, Social Origins of Educational
Systems, London, Sage Publications, 1979.
2. For a comparative overview of social demands for basic
education in Latin America, see Germán W. Rama, "Estrutura e movimentos
sociais no desenvolvimento da Educação Popular", in Germán W. Rama, ed.,
Mudanças Educacionais na América Latina - situações e condições, Fortaleza,
Universidade Federal do Ceará, 1983, 13-121.
3. The full argument is presented in Bases do Autoritarismo
Brasileiro, Rio de Janeiro, Editora Campus, 1982, which is outgrowth
of my doctoral dissertation on Regional Cleavages and Political Patrimonialism
in Brazil, U. C. Berkeley, Department of Political Science, 1973.
4. It would be necessary to distinguish between the instrumental
rationality incorporated by patrimonial regimes and the kind of full-fledged
formal rationalization carried on, most typically, by the Prussian state.
As described by Ringer, "The demand for legality was directly against the
purely personal government of eighteenth-century princelings who still regarded
their territories and subjects as their private property. It reflected the
burgher's search for a certain security in private life, and it justified
the official's view of his calling". In other countries, this call for legality
was part of a broader demand for political constitution; in Germany, however,
while it curbed the powers of unsystematic and arbitrary government, "it
did not limit the scope of bureaucratic, systematic absolutism, and it did
not imply any sort of popular participation in government". F. Ringer, The
Decline of the German Mandarins, Harvard, 1969, 114-115.
5. There is a large body of literature on the Brazilian
colonial past stressing the peculiar settlement patterns in the old capitancy
of São Vicente, far away from the colonial administrative centers, and responsible
for the epic explorations of Brazil's hinterland in the search for gold
and precious stones, the "bandeiras".
6. For a survey of enlightenment ideas in colonial Latin
America, see Roberto Boaventura, "Leituras de Raynal e a Ilustração na América
Latina", Estudos Avançados, São Paulo, 2, 3, 1988, 40-51. For Brazil,
see Eduardo Frieiro, O Diabo na Livraria do Cônego, São Paulo,
Itatiaia/Edusp, 1957.
7. There was nothing similar, for instance, to the dons
which, in England, were able to redefine their roles in those of their institutions
in English society, and thus find a new place and relevance for their universities,
even if not quite like they intended. Cf. Sheldon Rothblatt, The Revolution
of the Dons, Cambridge University Press, 1969.
8. Fundação Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística,
Séries Estatísticas Retrospectivas, Rio de Janeiro, vol. 1 (facsimile edition
of Anuário Estatístico do Brasil, ano V, (1939/1940), 1941).
9. What follows is based on S. Schwartzman, Helena M.
Bousquet Bomeny and Vanda Maria Ribeiro Costa, Tempos de Capanema,
Editora Paz e Terra / Editora da Universidade de São Paulo, 1984.
10. For several years now Brazil has a mandatory 8 years
cycle of basic education (7-15), and a three year secondary cycle. In practice,
the cutting line between the first four years of the primary cycle and gymnasium
for the following four was maintained, among other things by the fact that
only teachers for the 5-8 period are required to have university degrees.
11. "Las dos terceras partes del aumento de la matrícula
primaria registrado entre 1960 y 1970 [en América Latina] se deben al crecimiento
vegetativo y al aumento de la eficiencia interna, mientras que sólo un tercio
de dicho aumento responde a la incorporación de nuevos grupos sociales.
Esta comprobación pone de relieve la existencia de dos problemas centrales
en torno al sistema educativo en su nivel básico: el problema de la incorporación
de nuevos grupos sociales y el problema de la retención de los ya incorporados".
J. C. Tedesco, "Elementos para un diagnostico del sistema educativo tradicional
en America Latina", in, Germán W. Rama, Mudanças Educacionais na América
Latina - situações e condições, Universidade Federal do Ceará, 1983,
85-121, p. 92. Data is taken from Luís Ratinoff and Máximo Jeria, Estado
de la educación en América Latina y Prioridades de desarrollo, BID,
Departamento de Planes y Programas, División de Políticas Sectoriales, March,
1979 (mimeo).
12. "La peculiaridad de América Latina consiste en que
la cultura escolar comienza a masificarse cuando ella ha adquirido las características
de una cultura empobrecida, obsoleta y relativamente aislada, en cuanto
sus pautas conservan plenamente su sentido sólo dentro del ámbito de la
escuela. En consecuéncia, los modelos culturales que se ofrecen a las masas
de población que recién se incorporan al sistema no serían siquiera totalmente
representativos de los modelos dominantes culturalmente vigentes". J. C.
Tedesco, "Elementos para un diagnostico del sistema educativo tradicional
en America Latina", in, Germán W. Rama, Mudanças Educacionais na América
Latina - situações e condições, Universidade Federal do Ceará, 1983,
85-121, p. 100.
13. Cf. S. Schwartzman, "Brazil: Opportunity and Crisis
in Higher Education", Higher Education, 17, 1 (99-119).
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